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ABSTRACT 
Author: Eshan A. Dabak 
Title: Madness Then, Insanity Now: The Evolution of Madness and Medicine in India from Ancient 
to Modern Times 
Supervising Professor: Martha Ann Selby, Ph.D. 
 
My thesis will examine how madness and the medical systems that understood it have 
changed from ancient times to modern times in India. It begins with an examination of medicine in 
the Vedic era and considers the implications of a magico-religious epistemology that informed the 
treatment of madness in that time. From there, it moves on to the classical Ayurvedic systems of 
medicine and discusses the linkages and points of difference from the earlier system. In short, 
medicine generally becomes more empirically grounded, and madness is seen as having both 
somatic causes as well as external, “possession” causes.  
I then fast forward to the colonial era to focus on the development of the insane asylum 
under the British over the nineteenth century and the new authority relationships, power 
structures, and race relations that were implicated in the process. This is an especially crucial point 
in my thesis, and I spend many pages examining the topic because it is the first time that madness 
becomes institutionalized in the subcontinent. The next section moves on to the early twentieth 
century to understand how Ayurveda, dominant mostly in rural areas and long unrecognized by the 
colonial government, becomes resurrected for a modernized world and plays an important role in 
the debates around Indian nationalism. Finally, my last section uses anthropological sources to 
understand the nature of madness and its ties to kinship relations in contemporary India. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Mental health has received significant attention recently as new studies suggest it is more 
normal than anomalous to be afflicted with mental illness.1 John Copeland, immediate past president 
of the World Foundation for Mental Health, even calls it the “neglected global health priority.”2 As 
part of this global movement to increase awareness of the issue and expand treatments to those in 
need, “India was one of the first developing countries to recognize the need to address mental health 
with its National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) being launched in 1982,”3 but the fact remains 
that “the relationship between the regulation of madness and social responsibility is a complex issue, 
where the burden of accommodation falls to either the individual or the society at large or both.”4  
Recent legislation in India has shifted the focus of regulating madness from a public security 
standpoint to an individual, rights-based approach that involves “greater government responsibility 
in the implementation and regulation of mental health care.”5 I argue that this shift is all but recent 
and rather finds its roots further back in the history of Indian psychiatry with the transition from the 
notorious British-era asylums to the modern mental hospitals, and there are several key questions 
on which we can focus in order to understand the significance of the shift. For example, who has the 
authority to determine another person to be insane? Does this authority rest with medical 
practitioners or professionals in society? More basically, is madness a somatic or moral disease? 
Finally, are madmen’s identities intrinsically linked to their insanity or separate from their disease? 
 The reader should be alerted at the outset that my thesis will not answer such questions in 
any manner; rather, it will seek to understand how one region, India, has attempted to answer these 
questions and its implications for contemporary treatment, practice, and legislation. India is a rich 
                                                          
1 See Young and Copeland 
2 See Copeland 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Hyne-Sutherland 203 
5 Ibid., 164 
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focus for the study of madness thanks to its long and complex history, and the social context in which 
madness has been treated in India gives insight into the connections between madness and other 
fields, such as religion, medicine, and imperialism. Indeed, one of the first instances of mental healing 
in the subcontinent is a charm to cure insanity contained within the hymns of the Atharvaveda. The 
incantation is at once medical and religious – it is included in the section of the text that explores 
medical treatments, and it assumes a metaphysics drawn from the prevailing religious ideas of the 
time. Several thousand years later, madness became tied to the imperial framework imposed by the 
British with the advent of the insane asylums, the first time madness was formally institutionalized. 
Though the reach of such asylums was limited, they had important ramifications for colonial ideology 
and the desire to hide elements of society considered shameful. Since its independence from the 
British crown, India has devoted much attention to its mental health treatment system, leading to 
several landmark pieces of legislation that are evidence of an ever evolving and refining attitude 
towards madness.  
My thesis is organized chronologically with the intention of weaving together a story about 
the development of perceptions and treatments of insanity in India, particularly since the era of 
British colonialism. However, I include discussions of ancient and classical texts and their approaches 
to madness for several reasons. For one, when the British first encountered Indian medical texts, such 
as those of Āyurveda, they believed the texts to be representative of the actual medical practice at the 
hands of the practitioners. Hence, understanding the evolution of Ayurvedic thought throughout the 
Common Era was not central to their objectives. While it would be extremely helpful to examine 
commentaries on Āyurveda and shifts in its medical treatments, I will leave these segments out to 
limit the scope of my thesis since my study devotes primary attention to the attitudes towards mental 
illness during the colonial and subsequent periods. Secondly, a cursory glance at ancient and classical 
systems of thought will help provide context for local remedies prior to the arrival of the British. In 
addition, Āyurveda becomes a point of major concern of both the colonial government and the Indian 
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nationalist movements during the era of modernization, so a basic understanding of the Ayurvedic 
diagnostic and treatment system will aid our study of such interactions later on. 
In line with these goals, the first major phase I examine is that of the Vedic age. The medical 
references in the Atharvaveda are the earliest concrete ones with which we have to work (there is 
little that we can deduce based on our current knowledge of the Indus Valley Civilization), and one 
of them specifically mentions treatment of the insane (called únmaditam and únmattam in Sanskrit). 
In analyzing the four verses of the charm as representative of treatment of madness in the Vedic 
period generally, I have run the risk of over-generalizing and basing too much of my argument on 
limited source material. However, due to the underwhelming selection of primary sources and 
scholarship, there was hardly a way to bypass the issue, and I find the risk I have run to be preferable 
to ignoring this important period of history all together.  
Around the turn of the Common Era, the classical Ayurvedic system of Indian medicine takes 
authority over treatments. The primary sources for this phase, especially regarding the treatment of 
insanity, are much richer and well developed; in addition, the scholarship on this era is far better 
developed. I have chosen texts, both primary and secondary, to highlight the ways in which “answers” 
to the broad questions above were refined and/or revised through the transition into the classical 
period to provide a sense of continuity and to develop focal themes for my thesis. Overall, we can 
observe greater weight placed on empiricism as madness becomes progressively medicalized in the 
Ayurvedic tradition. Ayurvedic knowledge and treatments continued expanding through the 
centuries such that Āyurveda has practically become synonymous with Indian medicine for a modern 
observer reflecting on medicine in India prior to the arrival of the British.  
The next phase addressed in my thesis is the colonial era under British rule. Once again, I 
justify fast-forwarding through history with the assertion that the classical texts and their theories 
(not necessarily the lived practices) were of prime importance for the British administrators, at least 
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until the early 1900s. This period witnessed the emergence of non-indigenous (perhaps better called 
non-local) medicine in India. The insane asylum became imported into India from Europe, where it 
had already been implemented, and ushered in the institutionalization of insanity in the 
subcontinent. I have expanded on this section to great length relative to the thesis length because it 
is one of the most fascinating eras in Indian medical history and shapes the present developments in 
the mental illness treatment that seek to move past the legacies of the asylum. The connection 
between medical power and colonial power raised new challenges to the existing systems of 
medicine in India (primarily Āyurveda) and to the Indians who used them. I also included a section 
on the modernization of Āyurveda in order to give more context for the interactions between 
Western medicine and Indian medicine within which the treatment of madness is situated. For the 
first time, control over insane members of society became linked to the deeply-engrained notions of 
cultural superiority and served to legitimate British domination of the subcontinent. A separate 
question asks whether the institution turned out to be good news for the patients; in many cases, it 
appears to be the opposite case. The asylums generally treated patients as social ills of which society 
needed to be relieved rather than deserving treatment to cure them of their illness; this is precisely 
the attitude that modern legislation is progressively reversing.  
From one angle, the history of the asylum comes to an end with the independence of India in 
1947; nevertheless, the impacts of the asylum reach far into the following decades, and the modern 
mental hospital in India uses the framework of the asylum to help define what the modern institution 
will not be. This is correlated with the rise of outpatient care and the focus on therapy rather than 
exclusion and control. Lastly, by means of anthropological work, we get a glimpse into the variety of 
mental illness treatment facilities in contemporary north India. Some institutions seem to be the 
offspring of the British asylums while others strive to integrate care with the family, traditionally the 
locus of medical treatment. We also develop an appreciation for the difficulty of pinning down a single 
narrative of mental illness and are often left to grapple with the conflicting accounts of the institution 
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and various family members to understand the myriad ways in which madness both dissolves and 
forces a strengthening of familial relations.  
One criticism of the approach I’ve taken in my thesis – covering thousands of years of history 
in a mere eighty pages – would fairly point out that my treatment of each section would be superficial 
at best. I have aimed to supply enough history to set the context, and my focus has been addressing 
the ways in which broad questions and attitudes about madness – such as whether madness is 
identical with or separate from the patients whom it afflicts – have transformed through the centuries 
and given context to recent developments.  
Finally, I would like to say a few words about my sources. Much of what we know about Vedic 
healing is contained in the primary sources, the four Vedas; the Atharvaveda contains most of the 
Vedic passages related to medicine and thus includes the charm to cure insanity. I have used Kenneth 
Zysk’s translation and analysis in Religious Medicine for the purposes of my thesis; his work is one 
of few scholarly treatments of Vedic healing, so the choice of sources was rather limited. I also cross-
referenced his analysis of the charm with Fred Smith’s analysis of the same incantation as part of a 
massive study of possession to avoid depending too heavily on one interpretation of the verses. For 
my examination of Ayurvedic approaches to madness, I have used the translations of Priyavrat 
Sharma for accessing the primary sources and the analyses of Dominik Wujastyk to understand their 
context. While there are many Ayurvedic sources that address madness, I have largely limited myself 
to the Compendium of Caraka (the Carakasaṃhitā), one of the two main sources of Ayurvedic 
knowledge. The Compendium begins by outlining the fundamentals of Āyurveda, including the three 
humors (doṣas) and the numerous herbs and natural remedies that are prescribed. Interestingly, it 
is organized not by disease – e.g. insanity – but rather presents first a dense section on the diagnosis 
of hundreds of diseases. It then moves on to the specific features of each and later describes the 
remedies for each. While the Ayurvedic system does not derive as such from the Vedas, it holds the 
Vedas in high regard and often attributes its origin to them, most likely to gain social legitimacy. It 
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largely moves away from the heavy reliance on religious metaphysics found in Vedic healing but still 
makes room for seemingly incomprehensible diseases that are then attributed to spirits and deities. 
The development of treatments for madness in the colonial era is addressed most 
comprehensively in Mad Tales from the Raj by Waltraud Ernst, who examines many documents from 
the Raj, such as the reports of asylum superintendents. She organizes her study by theme: colonial 
politics, the institutions themselves, the role of the medical profession in colonial India, the patients 
held in the asylums, and finally the theories that informed the practice of medicine (primarily by the 
British). She considers the role of the asylum both in the lives of the patients and for colonial ideology. 
One of her most recent studies, Colonialism and Transnational Psychiatry, tracks the development of 
the modern Ranchi Indian Mental Hospital, which largely moves away from the asylum system. I have 
included a discussion of the modernization of the mental health institution in between the asylum 
era and the contemporary age. Finally, my section on contemporary north India is heavily based on 
the anthropological study by Sarah Pinto, Daughters of Parvati, which examines women in particular 
to make sense of the connections between mental illness and the struggles and demands of kinship. 
I engage with her analysis to reexamine the approach I have taken in working with my other 
materials because the picture of mental illness she paints with her words is complex in a unique way 
– it addresses at once the limitations of language, the desire to connect with other humans, and the 
flaws in current frameworks of understanding Indian psychiatry. 
The result, then, is a light walk through several thousand years of history, considering the 
various perceptions of madness: somatic, moral, a form of social deviance that needed quashing, an 
affliction that needed care, the identity of a patient, or simply one among many facets of a human life. 
Ultimately, the reader will find the colonial era and the subsequent modern period to be the core 
focus for which the discussions about ancient and classical healing are designed to provide basic 
background and context. 
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MADNESS IN THE VEDIC PERIOD 
 Our journey of examining madness in India will begin several thousand years ago in the Vedic 
era, elements of whose principles and worldviews can be found still in much of present-day Indian 
and Hindu culture. One of the key difficulties in studying medicine and madness in the ancient period, 
however, is the limited number of primary sources and the limited scholarship to date. One of the 
most comprehensive studies of healing in the Vedas was undertaken by Kenneth Zysk, whose book, 
Religious Medicine: The History and Evolution of Indian Medicine (1993) will be the primary source 
material for my discussion here. Since there is limited material with which to work, my focus in this 
section especially will be on ideas and implications rather than information; it is also important to 
keep in mind that due to the limitations of evidence available from this time period, many claims will 
be based on speculation rather than well-founded “facts.” Unfortunately, there is not a feasible way 
around the issue, so we must work with what we have available, which includes Zysk’s book. 
 The scriptures of Vedic medicine, “[u]nlike the ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian medical 
traditions which have specific treatises outlining their medical systems,” appear together with the 
religious literature contained in the Vedas (Zysk 4). Of the four Vedas, the Atharvaveda contains most 
of the hymns concerning medicine and healing though the metaphysics underpinning the treatments 
is established in the Ṛgveda, which is mostly religious in nature; both of these scriptures were 
preserved by means of an “extraordinarily accurate” oral tradition until they were written down 
much later (Zysk 5). Hence, it is evident from the outset that Vedic medicine was intertwined with 
Vedic religious practices, and we must examine medicine in this period as joined to religion. Nature 
played a key role in Vedic medicine as well: for instance, the Ṛgveda mentions the male plant divinity 
Kuṣṭha, and the Atharvaveda refers to the complementary female divinity Arundhatī, a healing plant 
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goddess.6 Hence, we will proceed with the understanding that medicine, religion, and nature were 
inseparably intertwined.  
 As mentioned above, “magico-religious” sums up the Vedic approach to medicine, and Zysk 
describes it in the following way: 
Causes of diseases are not attributed to physiological functions, but rather to external beings 
or forces of a demonic nature who enter the body of their victim and produce sickness. The 
removal of such malevolent entities usually involved an elaborate ritual, often drawing on 
aspects of the dominant local religion and nearly always necessitating spiritually potent and 
efficacious words, actions and devices. (8) 
 What is most striking about Vedic medicine, then, is that it appears to have understood 
disease in non-somatic terms (we will elaborate on this later); that is, the body itself became merely 
a means of carrying and expressing the disease without being fundamentally changed or degraded in 
the process. The healing process naturally focused on the spirits afflicting the diseased person rather 
than bodily treatments, and ritual became the primary means of curing the patient. An entire science 
of demonic possession and subsequent treatment was born from the combination of metaphysics 
and ritual practices; we can refer to it as bhūtavidyā, or the knowledge of spirits. A healing ritual 
would include religious incantations and charms, such as the ones found in the Atharvaveda. We will 
examine one that treats insanity later in this section. Such utterances were meant to grab hold of the 
demonic entity and encourage it to leave the body of the patient. The possessor could then be 
transferred into the ground, into another person, such as an enemy, or carried away and out of the 
community by animals and birds.7 Many of these demons became mythologized and incorporated 
into the religious lore. They were put in contrast to the deified remedial herbs, which were sometimes 
worshipped as goddesses.  
Several important ideas emerge from this discussion of medicine: words were understood to 
have power in and of themselves; the mechanism by which they could cure patients was based on a 
                                                          
6 See Zysk x 
7 Ibid., 9 
13 
 
framework of benevolent and malevolent possessing entities that could be driven away and 
contained by the power of words. Secondly, even though we may be tempted to see the principles of 
Vedic medicine as random or based purely on imagination, there was really an empirical, quasi-
scientific approach underlying them; Zysk writes that “[t]he empirical medicine evident during this 
period, on the other hand, involved both observation and experience in order to determine the cause 
of disease and to effect an appropriate treatment” (8). Charms and utterances were carefully 
observed for their efficacious properties in order to control the good and bad spirits. The succeeding 
classical Ayurvedic system was even more recognizably empirical in its approach, continuing and 
building upon the observation-based methods of Vedic medicine.  
I would like to say a few quick words about the notion of words themselves containing power, 
especially since this thesis seeks to understand perspectives on madness. In twenty-first-century 
America (and in most places across the world), we may be inclined to laugh or at least giggle at the 
thought of curing medical issues with words and onomatopoeic sounds, especially since our 
knowledge of medicine is heavily somatic. However, mental health treatment is still understood at 
least partially in non-somatic terms. Psychiatrists, of course, can prescribe medications for patients 
that control the levels of certain hormones inside the body. However, there is a long tradition of talk 
therapy that believes in the power of words to effect change and potentially cure the patient of mental 
illness, though some may assert that this form of treatment is declining in popularity.8 Still, almost all 
of us can say from experience that the comforting words of a friend, parent, or other trusted person 
can have a very real, healing effect on our minds, bodies, and spirits. Granted, our society doesn’t 
subscribe to the same metaphysical system as Vedic medicine; we would consider words to affect a 
person’s internal emotions, not external spirits. In any case, an honest evaluation of our own 
                                                          
8 The Doctor, The Patient, The Society, The Culture, taught by Dr. Stephen Sonnenberg. Personal communication, Spring 
2017. 
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understandings of mental health can help us to see an ancient medical system in a more sympathetic 
light.  
Having established this background about the workings of Vedic medicine, let us examine a 
charm to cure insanity using Zysk’s translation of the Atharvaveda Saṃhitā (Śaunakīya recension) 
6.111 (1993:62-63). Since this is the only charm related to madness from Vedic literature, I will 
reproduce it below for convenience along with some of the key Sanskrit terms included by Fred Smith 
in his reproduction (477): 
6.111 
1. O Agni, for me, release this man who, bound [and] well-restrained, utters nonsense. Hence, he 
shall make an offering to you when he becomes sane [ánunmaditaḥ]. 
2. If your mind is agitated, let Agni quieten [it] down for you. [For] I, being skilled, prepare the 
medicine, so that you may become sane. 
3. I, being skilled, prepare the medicine so that he, insane [únmaditam] because of a curse of the 
gods and demented [únmattam] because of the rákṣas-demons, may become sane. 
4. Let the Apsarases return you; let Indra [and] Bhaga re[turn you; in fact,] let all the gods return 
you so that you may become sane. 
 
 The charm makes clear our previous discussion of disease as the result of some external 
entity(ies). Interestingly, we can observe both possession by unwanted spirits as well as the 
abandonment by benevolent entities. Verse 3 asserts that the madman in question is “insane because 
of a curse of the gods” and “demented because of the rákṣas-demons.” Zysk takes this to be a form of 
insanity (únmatta) caused by “evil forces invading his body” (62). He contrasts this stronger form of 
insanity with únmadita madness, which is the result not so much of possession by undesirable 
demons but rather of personal transgression of moral laws, hence incurring the wrath of the gods. 
Smith is not entirely convinced that this distinction is significant due to the “absence of evidence for 
systematic usage of these terms in the AV [Atharvaveda],” but it could foreshadow “the later 
āyurvedic distinction between unmāda caused by accountable pathological factors and unmāda 
brought on by unaccountable invasive entities” (477). Regardless, it is clear that the treatment is not 
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overtly somatic since it is grounded in the epistemology of medical diagnosis – that is, the treatment 
involves bringing back the benevolent spirits and seeking release from the demonic entities.  
Two other points about the charm are striking – one, the ritual priests who recite the charm 
“prepare the medicine, so that you [the insane one] may become sane.” We can observe here an 
intersection between the magico-religious attitude to disease and the use of nature and herbal 
remedies to aid the treatment. This raises an interesting question about whether the accompanying 
rituals were themselves believed to perform the healing or whether they were mere accompaniment 
for the herbal remedies, in which case the natural formulations may have been believed to heal. Based 
on Zysk’s characterization of Vedic medicine, it seems more likely that the rituals, words, and sounds 
were understood to be truly potent, and the herbal medicines would have been a natural result of a 
culture that recognized divinities in plants. However, Zysk asserts that the “ritual practice is…purely 
symbolic, with the emphasis placed on purification and on the expulsion of the demon” (62). He also 
suggests that the medicines may have been intended “to calm the patient…and to drive away the evil 
forces invading his body” (62). Perhaps, then, the medicine was understood to be a powerful healing 
substance itself, but the mechanism by which it worked depended on a magico-religious schema in 
which the rituals symbolically aided the efficacy of the medicine. In any case, what is important to 
realize is that though the medicine may have been important, it only appears once in two verses of 
the incantation; on the other hand, every verse refers to celestial beings and the powers they exert. 
There is little doubt that the gods and demons were crucial for ritualized medical treatment. 
The second element deserving attention is the mention of the lunatic being “bound [and] well-
restrained” because of “utter[ing] nonsense.” Here, the madness seems to be characterized primarily 
by a disharmony between the lunatic and the community – he speaks in ways incomprehensible to 
his society, and he may have even been violent and thus requiring restraint for the safety of his 
neighbors. Hyne-Sutherland asks in her dissertation why societies define madness, and she describes 
how “[t]he very act of defining madness is a means of effecting control over the uncontrollable” (88). 
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In addition, based on her research of modern-day understandings of madness in India, “ascriptions 
of madness identify the relationship between a person and his or her society and not necessarily the 
internal state or experiences of an individual” (75). Both of these themes are at play in our 
examination of Vedic-era madness, revealing that certain basic assumptions about madness and the 
mystery that surrounds it connect our understandings today with those of an ancient culture. For 
example, the madman uttering nonsense is considered mad because it strains the relationships built 
on communication between that person and his community members and doesn’t necessarily 
indicate an internal condition or frightful experience. The restraint is evidence of the society’s 
attempt to control what appears to be uncontrollable and threatening behavior.  
This is not to suggest that modern society has made little progress with regard to mental 
health treatment but rather to emphasize that madness as social deviance that cannot be easily 
accepted by society is a common theme that transcends time and space. Interestingly, the charm asks 
Agni to “release [the] man,” and yet in order to be considered “cured” and acceptable for release into 
the community, he will have to be released from the bindings that society has placed on him. Viewed 
in this light, the physical restraint is a symbol for the clutches of Agni and the other deities who have 
grasped the patient, who is subject both to the authority of the deities as well as the authority of the 
priest and the community he represents. The healing process is possible only with both the priest, 
who performs the ritual and prepares the medicine, and the gods, who return to the man upon the 
priest’s request.  
Before finishing our discussion on Vedic healing, a word ought to be said about the social 
class of healers because their social status is correlated with (and possibly a cause of) the transition 
into the classical Ayurvedic systems. Vedic society was divided into three important classes 
according to Georg Dumézil’s characterization of ancient Indo-European society.9 The learned 
                                                          
9 See Zysk x 
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medical healers formed part of the third, agrarian-oriented order and thus passed their folk 
knowledge and literature orally. Thus, says Zysk, “the healing hymns of the Atharvaveda…reveal one 
of the earliest forms of folk healing of Indo-European antiquity, and offer an excellent example of 
ancient folk literature.”10 Many of the Vedic healing hymns brought together knowledge from the 
first-order sacrificial priests “whose words and actions were thought to bring them in direct contact 
with the greater cosmic forces” (Zysk xi). Thus, the healers were positioned to engage religious 
incantations as well as their herbal knowledge, and since they were not constrained by the rules and 
norms of purity that bound the first-order priests, they could freely serve “the needs of all people 
regardless of social standing” (Zysk xi).  
Originally, or so it is thought, the healers occupied a role that was on a similar level as that of 
the sacrificial priests. In time, however, the medical healers became considered contaminated from 
interactions with ritually “impure” segments of society and were subsequently “excluded from the 
higher, more sacred circles of the sacrificial cults” (Zysk xi). This limitation may have become a form 
of liberation for the healing priests because they could interact with communities on the margins of 
mainstream Vedic society without much concern for maintaining ritual purity. Contact with 
“heterodox ascetics and renunciants who did not censure their philosophies, practices and 
associations…[contributed to] a vast storehouse of medical knowledge [that] developed among these 
wandering physicians who…began…to conceive a radically new epistemology with which to codify 
and systematize this body of efficacious medical data” (Zysk xii). The gradual result: the classical 
systems of Ayurvedic medicine, to which we will turn next. 
  Let us first take a moment to review the key themes from the ancient period, which laid the 
foundation for medical knowledge development in the Indian subcontinent from roughly five 
                                                          
10 See K. G. Zysk, “Reflections on an Indo-European system of medicine,” in Perspectives on Indo-European Language, 
Culture and Religion, Studies in Honor of Edgar Polomé, Vol. 2 (McLean, Virginia: Institute for the Study of Man, 1992), 
321-36, quoted in Zysk xi 
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thousand years ago according to Zysk’s speculations. For one, Vedic healing relied primarily on a 
magico-religious epistemology in which the physician was responsible for gaining control of the 
benevolent and malevolent deities and spirits that either abandoned or possessed the patient. The 
healing process involved elaborate rituals to the accompaniment of magical incantations and sounds, 
and many of the sacred hymns were modeled after and/or borrowed from the literature of the 
sacrificial priests. In time, the medical segment of society separated itself both from and due to the 
authority of the religious priests. This allowed the healers to develop their own authority, free from 
the strictures of purity, leading to the Ayurvedic system.  
If we were to ask the question whether Vedic medicine (and mental health treatment) was 
more somatic or moral, we would probably conclude it was ultimately somatic, though in a radically 
different way compared to modern-day somatic treatments.11 The healing ritual did indeed involve 
some sort of medicinal preparation, and the spirits whom the healer controlled and expelled did 
possess the body of the patient. We may liken them to diseases like pneumonia that grip the patient’s 
body, and the ancient system of treating those diseases involved medicines and incantations rather 
than antibiotics. A moral understanding of madness would be apt to emphasize work therapy or 
other comparable treatment, not an external healing ritual that would dispel the demonic entities.  
Finally, we can ask the question of whether madness is something a person has or something 
a person is.12 Based on the Atharvaveda charm, it appears that insanity was not identical with the 
person insofar as the treatment was concerned. The patient and his body functioned as the covering 
and means of expression for the demonic entities who possessed it. Driving away the spirits and 
bringing the good spirits back would presumably restore the patient to normalcy. However, insofar 
as the society was concerned, the madman was probably identified with his madness because all that 
                                                          
11 We mentioned earlier that Vedic medicine is largely non-somatic; we are using “somatic” in slightly different ways, the 
difficulty of using the term points to the complexities of defining disease as bodily or non-bodily. 
12 See Hyne-Sutherland 99 for a detailed exploration of this question 
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mattered was that he posed a threat to the normal functioning of the community, either through 
senseless speech or through physical aggression, hence the need to bind and restrain him. Both 
perspectives are at play here, suggesting that they are not mutually exclusive. 
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MADNESS IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD 
 The transition to the classical systems of Indian medicine, commonly known as Āyurveda, 
brings about important developments in the history of medicine in India as notions of what madness 
is and how to treat it undergo significant change. Āyurveda as a medical system comprises a huge 
body of literature whose topics blend medicine with religious medicine, astrology, and yoga.13 In 
addition, numerous authors have contributed their findings to the corpus of manuscripts, two of the 
most famous being Caraka and Suśruta, whose Compendia “are absolutely fundamental to Āyurveda” 
(Dominik Wujastyk xxvi). As is the case with many historical documents and manuscripts, Caraka 
and Suśruta likely did not compose in entirety the compendia attributed to each; indeed, the 
Carakasaṃhitā (the Compendium of Caraka, henceforth quoted as CS) suggests in the statements at 
the end of each chapter that the Compendium is the framework of another author, called Agniveśa, 
who learned it from his teacher, Ātreya; it was merely redacted by Caraka.14 In addition, proposing a 
date for an enigmatic author like Caraka is no simple task, and “current scholarship tentatively places 
the composition of the earliest version of the Compendium in about the third or second centuries 
[BCE]” (Dominik Wujastyk 4). This dating is based on references in the texts of Chinese monks and 
the connection between Āyurveda and Buddhism, and the Compendium as we know it today may not 
have been completed until even 300 or 400 CE. In our discussion, we will say simply that “Caraka 
says xyz” or “Caraka’s text mentions abc”; we should keep in mind the challenges and questions of 
history, which suggests Caraka did not write all the statements attributed to him, but they will not be 
crucial for our purposes.  
 It would be wise to begin with a brief introduction to the basic methods and assumptions of 
the Ayurvedic medical systems. A large portion of my discussion here will be based on Dominik 
Wujastyk’s detailed study, The Roots of Āyurveda. Perhaps the most unique feature of Ayurvedic 
                                                          
13 See Dominik Wujastyk xxiv 
14 Ibid., 4 
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medicine is the doctrine of the humors, or tridoṣa-vidyā, which bears striking resemblance to the 
Hippocratic medicine that formed a medical basis in the Western world. Āyurveda relies heavily on 
the trio of vāta (wind), pitta (choler), and kapha (phlegm); the latter two form the core “duality [that] 
underlies a great deal of Ayurevdic thinking, a duality of hot and cold, dry and wet…medically in 
choler and phlegm” (Dominik Wujastyk 74). Vāta takes a more significant role over the other two as 
the doṣa that, according to Suśruta, “is the cause of the existence, origination, and disappearance of 
all beings.”15 The three humors are intimately connected with the seven dhātus, or body tissues, and 
the body’s waste products. As digestion is the central process of the body, “cooking” ingested food to 
turn it into a bodily tissue, diet is of utmost importance in Ayurvedic treatment. Other remedies 
include plant- and animal-based medicines, massages, bloodletting, sweating, and surgery.16 
Understanding the specifics of Āyurveda’s tenets is extraneous for the present task except for the 
aspiring Ayurvedic doctor, but a basic understanding will allow us to make better sense of the 
passages dealing with madness later on.  
 Another characteristic of Āyurveda’s approach that will become crucial to realize later on 
when Āyurveda will be placed in contrast to the Western medicine brought by the British is that it is 
principally allopathic – that is, it treats a cause with its opposite. Essentially, “one uses things which 
are the corresponding contraries to the causes of the diseases, applied in the right dosage and at the 
right time” (Dominik Wujastyk 19). Dominik Wujastyk notes several instances in the Ayurvedic 
literature where such an approach is explicitly outlined. For example, in the section on epidemics, 
Lord Ātreya quotes a saying that “[t]hose who know about herbs use cold to soothe diseases caused 
by heat…[a]nd the medicine for those diseases which are caused by cold is heat…[he goes on to say 
that] diseases caused by depletion cannot be soothed by anything other than a supplement…[a]nd 
similarly, diseases caused by surfeit cannot be soothed by anything but deception” (Dominik 
                                                          
15 See the Compendium of Suśruta, quoted in Dominik Wujastyk 74 
16 See Dominik Wujastyk xvii for a more elaborate overview of the basic tenets of Ayurveda 
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Wujastyk 48). This is an important notion because as it modernized, Āyurveda became the 
“indigenous and native” alternative to “allopathic” Western medicine, the so-called “Indian medicine 
for Indian bodies.” In reality, it was (and is) just as allopathic as the Western medical system with 
which it was contrasted.  
 So far, we may be tempted to think that Āyurveda was a fundamentally different medical 
system from the Vedic healing we encountered previously. Indeed, the somatic doctrine of the three 
humors, so central to Āyurveda, was effectively absent in the Atharvaveda medical hymns. In 
addition, we have not yet encountered ritual as a common means of treatment, especially since 
Āyurveda medicalized in a more familiarly empirical way the diseases that were previously seen to 
be the work of benevolent and malevolent deities. By the time of the Common Era, many diseases 
were understood to stem from an imbalance of the humors or blockages of transport tubes in the 
body that transport fluids, including manas, the mind, and nervous impulses.17 While possession and 
rituals to combat it continued from the Vedic age through the classical period and into the present 
day as well,18 “the medical ideas and practices preserved in the early Vedic literature…do not form 
an obvious precursor to the system of classical [A]yurveda…such medical material…is remarkable 
more for its differences…than for its similarities” (Dominik Wujastyk xxix). The question then 
remains of how to account for the fact that the Ayurvedic Compendia claim to be derived from the 
Vedas and revere the Vedic corpus. Wujastyk suggests this may have been rather a “bid by medical 
authors for social acceptance and religious sanction” (2003:xxix). By owing allegiance to the Vedas, 
which served and still serves as the basic core literature of Hinduism, the medical authors would have 
positioned themselves as legitimate members of Hindu society as well as legitimate in their methods 
of treatment. If we accept Zysk’s proposition that healers in the Vedic era gradually became pushed 
out of the higher, ritually purer segments of society, then the Ayurvedic system that developed from 
                                                          
17 Ibid., xx 
18 See Smith 544 for ethnographical accounts of modern day possession based on fieldwork in Kerala 
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their literature may have risked losing social legitimacy unless the authors could sustain its 
reputation by appealing to the foundation of the religious literature as also the foundation of the 
medical literature. If nothing else, such a theory makes for an engaging story. 
 A word ought to be said here about Āyurveda as “religious medicine” or Āyurveda as “Hindu 
medicine.” In the late colonial period, Āyurveda became revitalized as a form of medicine appropriate 
for Indian bodies and merged with ideas of a modernized Hindu society (this was partly since Unani 
medicine became “Islamic medicine” because Unani practitioners were largely Muslim, so Āyurveda 
became “Hindu medicine” since vaids were mostly Hindu). Around the turn of the first century CE, 
there is little doubt that developments in Ayurvedic medicine took place with the background of 
Hindu concepts, assumptions, and metaphysics. For instance, Ayurvedic physicians grappled with 
karma, fundamental in a discussion of Hinduism, and its applicability to medicine.19 However, there 
is evidence that suggests Ayurvedic authors were not concerned with making Āyurveda distinctly 
“Hindu,” and there are several points in the texts where the authors pay little attention to the taboos 
of the religious authorities. For example, Āyurveda freely prescribes meat and alcohol as part of its 
treatment regimens, and their use “is presented so completely without apology or explanation” 
(Dominik Wujastyk xx). One of Caraka’s commentators, Cakrapāṇidatta, even says that “[t]he 
recommendations of medicine are not intended to help achieve virtue (dharma). What are they for, 
then? They are aimed at achieving health.”20 At the same time, we should be careful not to overstate 
the divide between religion and medicine and their individual goals as both worked in conjunction 
to provide spiritual and physical health for the population, respectively. For example, Caraka 
mentions that the “prodromal symptoms of the patient of insanity caused by the wrath of gods [are] 
                                                          
19 See Meulenbeld 196 
20 See Cakrapāṇidatta on Caraka 1.9.29, quoted in Dominik Wujastyk xxi (translation by Dominik Wujastyk) 
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inclination to violence on gods, cow, brāhmaṇas and ascetics…” (CS 2.7.11).21 Clearly, he as a medical 
author still worked within the framework established by religious conventions and metaphysics. 
 The Ayurvedic system is the first robust, primarily medical tradition that developed in the 
Indian subcontinent. However, we should clarify what we mean by “medical” since our contemporary 
understanding of “medical” may be apt to bring to mind hospitals, surgeries, drugs, and prescriptions 
to treat illnesses, and so on. Indeed, correcting for the difference in time periods, we can observe such 
features as herbal drugs and surgeries22 in Āyurveda. But perhaps unlike or more so than our modern 
conception of medicine, the Ayurvedic system had a holistic approach built into it that was concerned 
not only with the disease at play but also the overall constitution of the patient, the environment, and 
other factors. For example, Wujastyk writes that “environment is important: it is vital to be in tune 
with the special qualities pertaining to each of the seasons” (2003:xx). It makes sense, then, why 
Caraka considers Āyurveda to treat a “conjunction of body, sense organs, mind and self” and how the 
“[m]ind, self and body…make a tripod on which the living word stands” (CS 1.1.46-47). We could 
expect that the mind and its derangement would be afforded considerable attention in a tradition 
that considers the mind to be one of the “locations of disorders as well as pleasures” (CS 1.1.55). This 
leads us naturally into a fascinating discussion of insanity.  
 Let us first develop a fuller understanding of the mind in the Ayurvedic system before 
discussing its derangement. Caraka begins his section on the mind by stating that it “is defined as the 
entity which…is responsible for production or otherwise of knowledge,” and its “[a]ction consists of 
control over the senses, self-restraint, reasoning, and analysis” (CS 4.1.18-21). We can identify two 
broad themes, then, concerning the mind – there is an element of self-control (“control over the 
senses” and “self-restraint”), and there is a component of proper knowledge and understanding 
                                                          
21 I am quoting the text as follows: CS refers to the Carakasaṃhitā, the first number refers to the book number (sthāna), 
the second number to the chapter, and the final number to the verse. 
22 Suśruta’s Compendium is particularly famous as a text with a strong focus on surgery. 
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(“reasoning” and “analysis”). Hence, the mind of a person, not an external force or even a proper 
constitution of the humors and tissues, was primarily responsible for making sure its possessor 
behaved according to societal expectations and reasoned according to established knowledge and 
norms. Thus, the mind had control both externally (outward behavior) and internally (thought 
process). Indeed, Caraka clarifies the latter point by stating that “[t]he sense-object is received by 
sense organs along with the mind…[t]hen the mind analyzes it in forms of merits or demerits and 
forwards it to Buddhi (intellect) which produces decisive knowledge by which one proceeds to speak 
or to do something with full knowledge” (CS 4.1.22-23). From these passages, it is important to note 
first that the mind as an entity that held authority over the person was recognized in the medical 
literature and secondly that it was crucial in maintaining the social well-being of a person.  
One may suggest that we are reading perhaps too far into “self-restraint” and that the control 
implied there really refers to “the emphasis...on moderation: whether it be in food, sleep, exercise, 
sex, or the dosage of medicines…” (Dominik Wujastyk xviii). In this case, the behaviors kept in check 
by the mind may serve more personal purposes, such as maintaining a healthy body, rather than 
keeping behaviors in line with socially established decorum. I suggest that there is evidence for both 
– Wujastyk provides a list of “corruptions…[that cause] defilement of the intelligence, destruction of 
the pathways along which the mind flows and, finally, insanity” (2003:245). Overlooking what may 
be reverse causation for the moment (the derangement of the mind being caused by such corruptions 
rather than causing them itself), the list includes “eating or drinking bad things,” “a failure in the 
performance of appropriate religious rituals,” and “one’s reason being devastated by mental anguish” 
(2003:245). We can observe three unique forms of corruption – that in the realm of ethics, that of 
deviation from social expectations, and that of personal ability to think clearly (this latter point may 
have manifested itself in either of the first two, either by leading the person to ingest something he 
shouldn’t ingest or fail to fulfill the community’s expectations of him); nonetheless, we can see both 
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restraint for personal benefit as well as self-control to fit with social norms in the functions of the 
mind. 
Despite the mostly somatic understanding of the mind we have thus encountered, it is 
important to realize that psychiatry in Āyurveda is discussed in the section on bhūtavidyā, which 
“indicates that, originally, this branch was concerned with disorders thought to be caused by 
possession by non-human spiritual beings” (Meulenbeld 185). It is not rigorously treated as a major 
component of Āyurveda, but it is there nonetheless. In line with the overall trend moving from Vedic 
to classical, in which many diseases began to be reinterpreted as having natural causes in a “process 
of demystification,” insanity started to be comprehended as caused by an imbalance of the humors 
(Meulenbeld 186). Rather than ascribing insanity to demonic possession alone, Caraka says that 
“[i]nsanity is of five types such as – those caused by vāta, pitta, kapha, sannipāta [combination of all 
three] and exogenous” (CS 2.7.3). The latter is particularly interesting because it acknowledges 
possession by deities as a valid form of insanity even when medicine was becoming increasingly 
empirical and observation-based. Meulenbeld suggests that this may have been because the 
Ayurvedic practitioners did not wish “to exclude patients suffering from these disorders from their 
practice… [and perhaps] did not like the idea of leaving these patients to the care of the exorcists” 
(186). In this case, the inclusion of possession-based types of madness may indicate a desire on the 
part of the physicians to assert their authority and expand their sphere of influence in the community. 
Alternatively, it may have been the case that āgantukonmāda, or exogenous insanity, helped account 
for forms of social deviance that were not explicitly negative or painful, described as mad only for 
being different from the “norm.”23 
Let us examine, then, passages from Caraka’s Compendium that describe the symptoms of 
madness. Several points will become apparent: symptoms vary according to the doṣa that is out of 
                                                          
23 This forms part of a fascinating discussion of possession into which we will not delve for space constraints. See Fred 
Smith’s massive study for further reading.  
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control, and they represent a wide range of behaviors, including those that are not threatening per 
se to other members of society but would be annoying nonetheless, those that are directly 
threatening to other members of society, and those that would attract harm to the lunatic himself. 
Caraka begins with the assertion that “[i]nsanity is defined as wandering about of mind, intellect, 
consciousness, knowledge, memory, inclination, manners, activities and conduct” (CS 2.7.5). This list 
appears to be a little vague and overly broad in scope at first, but we as a modern audience cannot 
help but wonder if we could do any better. We merely have to think of all the diverse cases in which 
we may be tempted to call a person “mad” in order to realize that our list is no shorter – we would 
call a person a lunatic for making strange sounds in public, for adhering to faulty rules of logic, for 
taking actions that clearly bring about harm to himself, and so forth. Hence, Caraka also seems to be 
defining insanity broadly as a collection of non-normative and disruptive behaviors much as we 
would. Very quickly, however, he describes the particular symptoms with far more precision, such as 
“foaming of mouth…inopportune excitement…liking loneliness…” (CS 2.7.6:1). This list may have 
been generated a priori by considering socially strange and disruptive actions, or it may have been a 
compilation of issues pertaining to those first deemed “mad” according to another standard – I am 
inclined to think the latter was more so the case due to the specificity of the symptoms listed. It makes 
the most sense to suggest that physicians like Caraka empirically examined their patients who had 
been considered lunatics already to create a list of abnormal characteristics for easier diagnosis and 
treatment in the future. 
The symptoms depend on the doṣa that is responsible for the insanity. For example, vātika 
insanity mostly comprises behaviors that are not dangerous for either the madman or society but 
could very well be highly disagreeable. Such symptoms include “frequent and inopportune smiling, 
laughing, dancing, singing, playing musical instruments…longing for non-available eatables while 
[showing] disregard and strong dislike for the available ones” (CS 2.7.6:1). We may even liken these 
symptoms to certain behaviors of children that can become frustrating for the adults in charge of 
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them, such as begging for foods that aren’t available and laughing due to insensitivity to the 
seriousness of the matter at hand. We would not call the children “mad” for we expect such behaviors 
to disappear with increasing maturity. In this light, vātika insanity is characterized by a lack of the 
maturity we may expect from adult members of the community. The indications of paittika insanity, 
on the other hand, are in fact dangerous for others in society and would have necessitated an imposed 
restraint for the greater safety. For example, “[i]ntolerance, anger…inflicting injury to own people or 
others with weapons, brickbats, whips, wooden sticks, and fists…” are clearly deviant actions that 
pose a threat to the social well-being (CS 2.7.6:2). Finally, kaphaja insanity resulted in behavior that 
wouldn’t have been very problematic except to the madman and his close family and friends. The 
symptoms described in this section give the image of a downtrodden, quiet, and lonely man, such as 
one who is “[s]tanding in one place, observing silence…frequent[ly] sleeping” (CS 2.7.6:3). There is 
little reason to believe that these behaviors would have attracted the displeasure of passersby or 
strangers in the community – after all, such an afflicted man would not have been playing music 
uncalmly or beating up his neighbors; rather, this madman would have been brought for treatment 
most likely by a close family member concerned about why the patient was suddenly so reclusive 
and unwilling to interact with others and help with family chores.  
Each of the afflicting humors was understood to cause madness through a somatic, 
empirically-grounded mechanism, such as “Vāyu [wind] [becoming] aggravated by the intake of 
rough, deficient and cold foods…”; the “doṣas get vitiated in the person having small proportion of 
sattva (guṇa) [pure or good quality] and affect hṛdaya, the seat of intellect…” (CS 6.9.5). The three 
forms of insanity caused by humoral imbalance previously discussed were considered “curable,” and 
an Ayurvedic physician presumably knew the proper prescription of “unction, fomentation, 
purgation…snuffing, smoking…inhalation of herbal juice…[and] bath” to cure the patient (CS 2.7.8). 
In case he didn’t know from memory the exact dosages and proportions in preparing the mixtures, 
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Caraka outlines these soon after. The following is an example of a medical preparation to treat 
insanity among other diseases. 
Undamaged garlic decorticated 200 gm. daśamūla 100 gm. should be boiled in water 5.12 
liters remaining to one-fourth. The ghee 640 gm., garlic juice 640 gm. along with the juice of 
kola (jujube), radish, vṛkṣāmla, mātuluṅga and fresh ginger, pomegranates, surā, curd water 
and sour gruel each 320 ml. and the paste of triphalā, devadāru, rocksalt, trikaṭu, ajamodā, 
yavānī, cavya, hiṅgu and amlavetasa each 20 gm. should be cooked. This ghee by intake 
alleviates colic, gulma, piles, udara, inguinal hernia, anaemia, spleen enlargement, female 
genital disorders, fever, worms, disorders of vāta and kapha and all types of insanity. (CS 
6.9.52-56) 
To say the least, Caraka is impressively specific with the proportions of each ingredient, and he 
assumes a familiarity among other physicians of the technical terms and names of herbs and other 
ingredients that he uses.  
On another note, the notion of words possessing power that we mentioned earlier in the 
Vedic section in relation to modern talk therapy continues through this period – Caraka suggests that 
“[a] friend should console him [the lunatic] with religious and purposeful words” (CS 6.9.79). I would 
suggest that unlike the Vedic incantations, which were intended to dispel malevolent spirits, the 
mechanism by which words heal in Āyurveda is more grounded in the patient himself without 
reference to external entities – talk therapy was intended to bring about a moral improvement in the 
patient’s outlook on life and cure him of the mental illness. Among the treatment methods, however, 
are some that may strike us as rather odd – “frightening, inducing surprise and forgetting, 
desaturation and blood letting…” (CS 2.7.8). Caraka explains the logic as follows: “[h]e should be 
terrorised with teeth-less serpent, trained lion or elephant or armed thieves or enemies, or the royal 
servants should take him out well-tied and terrorise him intimidating to kill by king’s orders…[t]he 
fear of life is above that of the bodily affliction and as such it leads to pacification of the mind deranged 
wholly” (CS 6.9.84). We can thus assert with confidence that Ayurvedic physicians relied on both 
somatic as well as moral treatments for their insane patients, suggesting that they recognized a 
component of each in the causes of madness. 
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Perhaps a quick aside about physicians’ ethical expectations would be helpful after a mention 
of the violent and threatening treatment methods advised for lunatic patients. Dagmar Wujastyk 
notes that “Caraka indicates fairly clearly that these threats are just that: the patient is at no time in 
real danger of losing his life” (2012:138). She follows up with several examples, such that “the snake’s 
fangs should have been removed…[and] it is very unlikely that true criminals were at the physician’s 
disposal…” (2012:138). Hence, she concludes that the threats engaged in lunacy treatment are a form 
of deception itself, and while Caraka is “demanding honesty of the practicing physician…[he] 
differentiates between lying and withholding the truth” and speaking truthfully from speaking the 
full truth (Wujastyk, 2012:133). In this scheme that “reflects a fundamental paradigm of medical 
paternalism,” the physician takes full authority over the lunatic patient and proceeds with a course 
of treatment in which the ultimate goal, bringing to rest the patient’s disturbed mind, justifies a 
breach of ordinary ethical expectations of the healer. Wujastyk also notes that “the actual mental 
processes that bring on this change are unfortunately not explained by Caraka,” so we must be left to 
imagine how such treatment would have worked to heal madness (2012:138-9).  
Interestingly, deception and the use of threat in treating madness is an instance where 
Āyurveda deviates from its “explicitly allopathic” approach of treating the cause of the disease with 
its opposite (Dominik Wujastyk 8). Much like Caraka, Suśruta advises “show[ing] him [the patient] 
startling things, or tell about the death of one dear to him…[and] intimidate him…with tamed 
elephants and poisonless snakes.”24 However, “just a few sentences before (Uttaratantra 62.12), 
Suśruta describes how the fear for one’s life, but also the loss of what is dear to one, can be the very 
causes of madness” (Wujastyk, 2012:139). In this case, Ayurvedic treatment takes a more 
recognizably homeopathic approach – treating like with like. 
                                                          
24 Suśrutasaṃhitā Uttaratantra 62.17-21b, quoted in Wujastyk, 2012:139 
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 So far, we have discussed broadly two methods of treatment for insanity in the Ayurvedic 
tradition – the somatic treatments, such as “garlic juice” and “curd water,” and the non-somatic ones, 
such as “frightening” and “inducing surprise.” It appears that these were used in conjunction to treat 
the insanity caused by the imbalance of doṣas because while insanity was brought into the realm of 
the “empirico-somatic” (versus the “magico-somatic” in the Vedic period), it was understood to have 
other, moral dimensions as well. The authority of the physician could overpower the authority of the 
disease in these cases, hence their classification as “curable” (CS 2.7.9); there were cases, however, 
in which the insanity asserted its authority even over the physicians. The sānnipātika insanity, caused 
by a “combination of three doṣas,” was “said as incurable by the experts,” and it appears that some 
forms of āgantuka, or exogenous, insanity were also incurable (CS 2.7.7). Regarding the latter, there 
was uncertainty as to the true cause of the disease – “[s]ome say the inauspicious action done in 
previous life [is] its cause…[it] also is caused by intellectual error…” (CS 2.7.10).  
It is also evident that such insanity came in three forms according to the “object [of] insaning 
(sic.) by insanity-producing agents – such as violence, pleasure, and worship” (CS 2.7.15). The violent 
one was incurable on account of incorrigible behavior, such as “enter[ing] into fire…strik[ing] himself 
with weapon…and tak[ing] other suicidal action” (CS 2.7.15). For the madman committed to taking 
his own life, there was little that the physicians could do to save him, and Caraka is unclear about 
exactly which remedial measures were applied. It is possible that the same measures described for 
the two curable types – “recitation of mantras, wearing of roots and gems, auspicious rites, offerings, 
gifts, oblations, religious rules, vow, propitiation, fasting, blessings, prostration, visit to religious 
places, etc.” – may have been applied to the violent one (CS 2.7.16). (I say it is unclear because in the 
section on treatments [CS 6.9.88], Caraka speaks generally about treating “insanity caused by gods, 
sage, fore-fathers or gandharvas” while in the section on diagnosis [CS 2.7.15], he specifies those 
remedial measures as applying to the “two…curable ones.”) 
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 In any case, this section is most striking for the continuation of the magico-religious elements 
from the Vedic healing system. In this case, however, they seem to indicate a recognition of the limits 
of medicine and its physicians working “in this world” and that there were causes of insanity that 
could not be readily explained in empirico-somatic terms, such as possession by gods, gandharvas 
(celestial musicians), and forefathers. The insanity caused by each grāha, or “grabber” (possessor in 
this case), resulted in behavior pertaining to the characteristics of each, including symptoms that 
may not appear to indicate anything “wrong” or “undesirable.” For example, madness caused by the 
gandharvas manifested itself as “fondness for musical instruments played by mouth, dance, music, 
food and drink, bath, garland, incense and perfumes, [and] liking for red apparel” among other 
seemingly benign characteristics (CS 6.9.20). It may be reasonable to believe that such qualities may 
not have been indicative of madness in and of themselves, but certain people deemed lunatics may 
have exhibited such characteristics to an unusual degree. Furthermore, if their insanity had not been 
cured or alleviated by the somatic treatments outlined, these symptoms may have been likened to an 
external cause, including possessors such as gods and gandharvas. Interestingly, each grāha was 
linked to a personality, and a person with such natural tendencies would be more likely to be affected 
by the respective entity. In the case of the gandharvas, for instance, they would “enter into the person 
who is fond of praising verses, vocal and instrumental music; has liking for other’s wife, perfume and 
garlands…” (CS 6.9.21).  
 While the majority of the symptoms of madness in classical Āyurveda do carry an obvious 
negative quality, such as “perverted intellect, psychic agitation…impatience, [and] incoherent 
speech,” we cannot ignore the seemingly positive connotations of certain symptoms of exogenously 
caused insanity, such as “calm look, serious, unassailable,” which were due to insanity caused by gods 
(CS 6.9.6, 6.9.20). Going back to Meulenbeld’s suggestion that exogenous insanity may have been 
included in the medical texts so as not “to exclude patients suffering from these disorders from their 
practice,” it may have been that the medical practitioners felt compelled to exert authority over a 
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range of non-normative behaviors, including those that may have felt quite pleasant for the lunatic 
and were not threatening to other members of society (186). The non-normative in these cases may 
refer to behaviors that were unusual for that person’s established behavioral pattern. Nevertheless, 
one may point out, for example, gandharva-induced insanity results in a fondness for music, dance, 
and incenses, and the likely victim of such insanity would have been someone who already enjoyed 
music and perfumes or had that latent tendency. I would suggest that such a person perhaps used to 
enjoy music and perfumes but still worked as a contributing member of the community. His behavior 
may have become labeled as insanity when his love for music and incense left him unable to perform 
the tasks expected of him, at which point his family or close friends would have brought him to an 
exorcist if they believed he was being possessed. In order to provide treatment to such people, the 
Ayurvedic physicians may have felt compelled to include a discussion of exogenous insanity in the 
texts. 
 With this, let us conclude our section on madness in the classical period with a recapitulation 
of the most salient themes.  First, I would like to clarify that our examination of Āyurveda was limited 
to the theoretical, text-based system as we did not consider commentaries and accounts of its lived 
practice. This was partially to fit the scope of this thesis and partially because the texts, not the lived 
practice, was initially the point of concern for colonial authorities (this thesis takes the colonial era 
as its primary focus). It is not simply plausible but highly likely that everyday treatments did follow 
literally from the texts. Physicians likely used a “complex heritage of texts and practices” in their 
everyday medical roles much like the hybrid that Smith has noticed among Ayurvedic practitioners 
in contemporary Kerala reportedly “follow[ing] the practices of possession and exorcism outlined in 
the IŚP [Īśānaśivagurudevapaddhati, a tantric text]” (544).  
Perhaps the most important shift with the advent of Ayurvedic medicine is the medicalization 
of madness and other diseases into obviously somatic terms. However, we concluded earlier that 
Vedic healing was, in its own way, somatic. In order to distinguish between these two senses of 
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“somatic,” we used “empirico-somatic” to describe Āyurveda and “magico-somatic” to refer to Vedic 
medicine. That is, Āyurveda placed the body as central, and most causes of illness were grounded in 
it, such as imbalances of three humors. Attribution to external possession largely gave way to 
empirically identifiable causes. In addition, Ayurvedic practitioners adopted an empirical approach 
to studying the body, the result of which was the complex understanding of channels in the body that 
transported various substances, including the mind and the humors. This contrasts with Vedic 
healing, in which the body did not contain within it the causes of illness but rather functioned as a 
conduit through which external spirits would bring on diseases.  
Regardless, possession continued to hold a place in Ayurvedic medicine, possibly because 
medical practitioners wished to provide treatment to patients whose diseases defeated the 
established medical knowledge and cures. While affliction by gods, gandharvas, and other entities 
may seem to be a more serious form of madness than one caused by, for instance, an excess of the 
pitta doṣa, this does not necessarily appear to be the case. Paittika insanity resulted in behaviors that 
were obviously threatening to other members of society, but certain symptoms of possession 
insanity, like a fondness for music and dance, would have done considerably less to harm others and 
would have probably been pleasant to experience for the patient. Hyne-Sutherland identifies this 
peculiarity and analyzes it as follows: 
There is a wide range of behaviors indicative of unmāda according to this medical text [the 
Compendium of Caraka], some far more agreeable than others. So much more than “mental 
illness,” unmāda can actually be viewed as a condition that, depending on the symptoms, can 
lie anywhere on a spectrum of well-being, from incredibly impaired to exhibiting super-
human traits. Certain stereotypical features occur in more than one definition – incoherent 
speech and excessive laughter, for example – and some are more specific, such as the 
gandharva type having an affinity for music. The condition unmāda was, in some ways, 
defined as a very positive experience…To an extent, even the gandharva-subtype seems to 
describe a largely positive experience…After all, even the positive symptoms would have 
impaired a patient’s ability to function in a normal way, in accordance with social roles and 
expectations. (91-92) 
The key, then, to understanding unmāda, madness, in Āyurveda is examining deviance from 
established norms, both social and personal, rather than conditions of derangement or painfulness. 
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Interestingly, this theme underlies even our present-day usages of the word madness – the ever-
popular “madly in love” makes the point quite well. For the person who is “madly in love,” the 
experience of the “madness” is probably one of ecstasy and ebullience of joy. Others may call such a 
person “mad” because his excessive love keeps him from fulfilling his duties and expectations, such 
as forgetting about important work meetings because of thinking about the next date night.  
Finally, it is important to realize how long Āyurveda has endured – the core texts were written 
in India around two thousand years ago, give or take five hundred years, and Ayurvedic knowledge 
is being incorporated into medical repositories all over the world.25 Part of the remainder of this 
thesis will explore the journey of Āyurveda as it modernized and faced other medical systems, such 
as that of Western biomedicine brought by the British.  
 
  
                                                          
25 See Fincher viii 
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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE 
 The institutionalization of mental health care at the hands of the British was one of the most 
important historical markers for mental health treatment in the Indian subcontinent for the complex 
issues of racism, classism, and colonialism that it raises. One could look at the lunatic asylums 
established in the late 1700s onward as the zenith of the irony of British colonial rule, or one could 
see them as a social experiment, a means to enforce the hierarchies of race and class that the Raj 
brought with it, keeping in mind, however, that it would be simplistic merely to posit the “colonial 
elite” in opposition to the “exploited natives” (Ernst, 1991:8). Never quite a static phenomenon, the 
asylum system changed over the nineteenth century as the tensions and contradictions between 
social protection, personal greed, and colonial authority shifted one way or another. The most 
comprehensive study on this particular chapter of the Raj was undertaken by Waltraud Ernst. Her 
book, Mad Tales from the Raj, which focuses on the insane in India from 1800-1858, will be the 
primary source of material for my discussion.  
 Since the asylums were a product of the British community in India, it would be natural to 
ask about the composition and role of this group. When the British East India Company took over 
rule of the subcontinent in 1757, a small but powerful British community resided at major company 
centers, including Bombay, Madras, and the capital at Calcutta. Strictly speaking, these expatriates 
were not colonizers in the sense that the word is used to describe European colonies in the Americas. 
Many of the British in India considered India to be “the land of hopes and dreams” where they could 
one day make a fortune to take back home to England (Ernst, 1991:10). Especially since India was a 
temporary residence rather than their future home, the community remained tight-knit and largely 
distanced from the native Indians (“natives” to use Ernst’s term; I opt for “locals”). The asylums 
reflected these characteristics woven into the fabric of the British – a desire to emphasize European 
superiority, a need to separate the higher-class members of society from the lower-class 
counterparts, and the promise of making a quick fortune. At the same time, the institutions exhibited 
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the compromise between such attitudes and the humanitarian motives that one would expect to 
underlie the provision of health care.  
 My discussion of this pivotal chapter in Indian medical history will proceed according to the 
following general outline: the European medical professionals in India, the theories motivating the 
lunatic asylums, the institutions themselves along with the patients maintained there, and the politics 
surrounding the system. As a word of caution, many of the “medical doctors” referred to in this 
section were British doctors practicing in India, not ethnically Indian doctors. 
 The first half of the nineteenth century dramatically altered the perceptions, reputation, and 
role of the medical profession in India. Broadly speaking, it transitioned into a legitimate career from 
a money-making opportunity fraught with embezzlement and suspicion. The “mad-doctors,” so to 
speak, faced a steeper path to legitimacy than their fellow medical professionals since “[t]hose who 
dealt with the mad, treating or caring for them, tended to a certain extent to share the stigma that 
was bestowed upon their charges” and since psychiatry was a marginal specialization within 
medicine (Ernst, 1991:89). Even medical colleagues would consider the mad-doctors substandard 
for specializing in an unfounded branch of science. 
 Doctors in general held a tenuous reputation with the public due to the numerous shady 
incidents that occurred and the subsequent rumors spread. Graphic imaginative accounts such as 
butchers receiving a surgeon’s certificate are testament to the distrust of medical professionals,26 and 
while exaggerated, they do at least suggest systemic inappropriate use of authority. In fact, Ernst 
writes that appointees for a surgeon position were “frequently not so much fulfilling a position as a 
medical officer [since they desired] the potentially large fortunes that could be made in the East” 
(1991:92). In fact, one of the most frowned-upon sources of income was the exploitation of hospital 
                                                          
26 See W.B. Beatson, ‘The Indian Medical Service, Past and Present’, review in British Medical Journal, 2, 1902, p. 1182, 
quoted in Ernst, 1991:92fn5 
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contracts. It was part of the surgeon’s duty to care for his patients by providing them sustenance, 
garments, and other basic needs.27 However, there was little to stop the surgeons from pocketing a 
few of the provisions for the sick along the way, which took its toll on the patients.  
 Several events in the early nineteenth century remedied this issue by raising the barriers to 
entry into the medical profession. For example, beginning in 1822, candidates were required to have 
a diploma from certain surgery schools,28 and 1855 brought competitive exams that solidified the 
medical profession as a legitimate career rather than a sneaky and dishonest profit venture. Despite 
such changes to the medical profession generally, psychiatry, or rather the treatment of lunatics as it 
was probably better understood at the time, remained marginalized for good reason. For example, 
the Beardsmore incident, which highlights the tensions between the medical board and the private 
madhouse owner (who was not, by any means, qualified or knowledgeable in medical practice), “was 
a challenge to the board’s authority…[by] [t]he very fact that a medically unqualified individual with 
a lower-class background was allowed by the Company’s authorities to manage an institution” (Ernst, 
1991:95). Hence, members of the medical board worried that doctors of the mad threatened the 
foundations of their authority and legitimacy, and lunatic asylums were little recognized with few, if 
any, interest groups to represent their unique interests.29 Remember that the doctors and 
professions we have been discussing refer to Europeans, not ethnic Indians. It would be until about 
1855 before Indians were accepted into higher ranks of the medical service.30 
 While these general changes were taking place within the British Indian medical community, 
a more significant shift was occurring with the way madness had been understood. Ernst refers to 
this as the “medicalization of madness” over the first several decades of the 1800s as mental health 
treatment gained recognition as its own specialty within medicine (1991:101). It is important to note 
                                                          
27 See Ernst, 1991:93 
28 Ibid., 96 
29 Ibid., 97 
30 See Ernst, 2014:1 
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that this is not the first time mental illness is recognized as a unique malady. Rather, this can be seen 
as the first time (within the British Indian context) that the treatment of madness is recognized as 
deserving its own attention and specialization. Ernst expresses the shift as follows: 
When in 1856 Dr J. Cantor was finally authorized to take over the charge of the Beardsmores’ 
asylum, the seal of medical supremacy in the treatment of the insane in British India’s main 
centres was set. However, only slowly was the care for the mentally ill to become universally 
acknowledged as an area of medical science requiring specialist skills. Cantor’s appointment 
could nevertheless be seen to mark a movement away from the conviction that the care of the 
mad was merely a ‘difficult’ and ‘peculiar’ task, to the opinion that the mentally ill could only 
be looked after by specialists with broad medical qualifications. (1991:101) 
 This process of medicalization was received unevenly with some medical professionals under 
the impression that “a knowledge of the nature and treatment of Insanity is now expected of every 
well-educated man”31 while others expressed two decades later that the average medical 
professional showed little additional knowledge of the methods of treating the insane than the 
general public.32 In any case, a discussion of the medicalization of madness raises the question of the 
somatic and moral dimensions of madness. I would assert that the process by which madness gained 
more recognition in the medical world did not fundamentally alter the somatic understanding of 
madness that already existed. In the classical Ayurvedic context, it is evident from the earlier chapters 
that madness was understood in largely somatic terms; even with British doctors in India, madness 
was indeed conceived of as primarily an affliction of the body. Thus, there was the underlying 
assumption that medical doctors could treat madness. While the somatic conception of madness 
didn’t change over the early 1800s – madness remained fundamentally a disease of the brain33 – it 
became recognized as a separate discipline within medicine deserving of its own treatment methods 
and certification.  
                                                          
31 See J.C. Bucknill and D.H. Tuke, 1858; J. M. Granville, 1877; cf. Scull, Museums of Madness, p. 166, quoted in Ernst, 
1991:101fn26 
32 Ibid.  
33 See Ernst, 1991:103 
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 Nevertheless, the justification for a specialized, somatic approach to madness found 
challenges, notably with the Tukes, Quakers in Britain who subscribed to a “doctrine of ‘moral 
therapy’” to treat madness (Ernst, 1991:102). Understanding lunatics to lack self-restraint and 
control, they advocated for “kindness and moral education” to treat lunacy and gained great prestige 
for the success of their methods (Ernst, 1991:102). This presented a challenge to both the medical 
doctors treating the mad as well as the medical boards in general. After all, the medical professionals 
could not claim to produce the high recovery rates that the Tukes could, challenging the idea that 
somatic medicine was best suited to treat madness and the underlying assumption that madness 
affected the brain. This naturally threatened doctors’ reputations, theories, and of course, incomes.  
We will return to the Tukes again in a discussion of the philosophies that influenced the 
understanding of lunatics as socially deviant human beings. Before touching on that topic, some 
words ought to be said about the relationship between the British treatment system and Ayurvedic 
medicine. An imperialist state brings with it an ideology of superiority over its subjects and nearly 
every dimension of their identities. Indeed, the “great colonial medical myth…[saw] [t]he medical 
doctor…[as] a major pillar of European colonial ideology in that his services for the good of 
humankind were seen to legitimate foreign rule and to serve as proof of the unquestionable 
superiority of western civilization in general” (Ernst, 1991:111). Though interaction between the 
two systems was limited, folk medicines, such as temple healing, pandits, and pujaris, needed to be 
subordinated in order for the British to maintain colonial order. It would be interesting to examine 
the difficult question of whether, at this time, the medical boards and doctors sought to learn about 
Āyurveda before condemning it or if their distaste was motivated internally by the idea that the 
medical system they brought and practiced was superior by virtue of its being a product of western 
civilization.  
In either case, it would suffice to say that British medical boards in India felt a strong 
conviction that European medicine was superior to that offered by local Indians, even though 
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European doctors were occasionally confronted with evidence that Indian practitioners prescribed 
effective remedies.34 In this capacity, one can sense a feeling of threat underlying the attitudes against 
Indian medicine, and reports of Āyurveda’s effective remedies “tended to fuel the ever-growing 
hostile response towards them” because they made western medicine appear less formidable than 
the colonial state would have liked (Ernst, 1991:105). Unsurprisingly, the opinions towards local 
medicine fell in line with the generally racist understanding of Indians woven into the fabric of the 
Raj, and Indian practitioners received worse treatment than the mixed Eurasians, who were already 
considered beneath the Europeans.35 
One can discuss the guiding philosophies of the asylums in two contexts: the treatment 
approaches and the political ones. Here, I would like to address the motivations behind the variety of 
treatment methods. As a word of caution, it should be noted that for much of the earlier part of the 
nineteenth century, notions of individualism rooted in the philosophical writings of Locke, Hobbes, 
Pinel, and Esquirol contributed to the imprecise and inconsistent application of terminology, 
especially concerning the treatment of the mad. From our earlier mention, consolidation of lunacy 
treatment did not come until the middle of the 1800s. As a result, “[i]t would therefore be an attempt 
doomed to failure to postulate anything like an ‘authoritative definition’ of the contemporary concept 
of insanity” (Ernst, 1991:134).  
With this in mind, we can analyze treatment methods as an interplay between somatic ideas 
and moral ideas. It is important to realize that in general, a given doctor’s methods did not derive 
solely from any one philosophy; rather, his approaches blended (rather imperfectly) various theories 
about the origins of madness. One such guiding principle was a theoretical distinction between the 
“mad” and the “idiots,” which was hardly useful in practice for appropriately categorizing patients. 
Where idiots were understood to be beyond cure due to bad reasoning, the “mad” were seen to 
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reason correctly but from false premises. Evidently, there was an assumption that false premises 
could be corrected, but improper reasoning was hopeless. Funny enough, one could call the British 
in India generally “mad” by this definition – reasoning correctly from false premises. The colonial 
agenda was based on a false premise of racial and cultural superiority but then used proper reasoning 
to find ways of asserting the dominance of the “superior” Europeans. In any case, the madness was 
ascribed certain causes, many of which concern an exposure to the new and discomforting situations. 
For example, the fear of being caught by a tiger, sudden fright, and exposure to a new, tropical 
climate36 were cited as reasons for madness. Nevertheless, the ascribed causes rarely changed the 
course of treatment, but they did engender an attitude of sympathy rather than blame towards the 
madmen.37 
In addition to the Lockean distinction between the “mad” and the “idiots,” non-medical 
approaches included the “moral therapy” of the Quaker Tukes as well as the “non-restraint” of Hill 
and Conolly. The language of these systems “assumed centre-stage in official reports and regulations” 
over the medical theories primarily advocated by members of the medical boards (Ernst, 1991:134). 
Hence, a clear tension existed between the Company authorities, who found the success of the non-
medical approaches alluring in the larger interest of treating the mentally ill for both their own good 
and the greater social order, and the medical practitioners, who were forced “to provide medical 
reasons for unreasonable behavior if they wanted to maintain their public and self-image as 
knowledgeable experts” (Ernst 147). Whose legitimacy won out is not an easy question as doctors 
often blended the non-medical theories into their existing medical practice, and the overlap points to 
the ultimate futility of clinging to such rigid categories as “medical” and “non-medical” though they 
can be of some use for the present purposes.  Dr. W. Cambell of Bombay serves as a prime example. 
Incorporating Dr. John Brown’s theory of most diseases resulting from an excess or deficiency of 
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irritability, he used medical means such as narcotics to bring lunatics into contact with the 
pleasurable and the good while shielding them from the irritable.38 In essence, regarding the 
treatment of the mad in the first half of the nineteenth century in British India, we can observe a 
balancing act on one level between the authorities of somatic and moral conceptions of madness and 
on another level between the authority of the Company directors, who found the success of moral 
treatments promising, and the medical professionals, who desperately tried to give medicine a 
reputable name in lunacy treatment because their own reputations and incomes hinged on it. 
This would also be an appropriate place to point out that the British doctors’ treatments 
combining a moral theory with somatic treatments mirrors in some ways the Ayurvedic system from 
our earlier chapter, the very system against which the British doctors rallied. Though primarily 
somatic, Ayurvedic medicine took a strong moral approach at times; our reader will recall the 
purposeful and spiritually uplifting words prescribed by Caraka (along with the occasional threat in 
dire situations) to supplement the multitude of herbal remedies described in the texts.  
Earlier, we mentioned that it would be misleading to say there was one established and 
universally accepted approach to treating madness within the British medical community. Indeed, 
the unevenness applies just as well to the asylums across the subcontinent at any given point in the 
early 1800s as well as to the conditions of the asylums generally over the course of the 1800s. The 
story that emerges is one of frequent change within the asylum, caught between various private and 
public incentives, against the backdrop of an unchanging, hegemonic symbol of the asylum 
throughout British India. We will discuss three major asylum centers: Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, 
with a special focus on the latter. Note that there are few data available to derive an accurate image 
of the rates of mental illness in the general population and fewer data still for the percentage of those 
institutionalized in the asylums. Especially when asylums held minor significance compared to jails 
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and hospitals, institutionalization for mental illness affected a very small percentage of the 
population. An additional challenge comes with the fact that treatment of mental illness was 
traditionally the charge of family and friends, at least for the Indians, and many families would hide 
their lunatics from the public for fear of a tainted social image. Finally, street lunatics, at least in 
Bengal, would frequently be sent to jails or hospitals instead,39 possibly due to the high cost of the 
asylums.40 As such, the asylums are not significant so much due to the number of people affected but 
rather because of their symbolic importance, an idea we will return to towards the conclusion of this 
section.  
 With that being said, the asylums in India can be thought of as part of a social experiment 
beginning in Britain and evolving to meet the demands of philanthropists and human rights 
advocates. Hence, it would be a mistake to think of the asylums as a tried and true method of 
controlling socially deviant behavior since they, like the European hospitals Foucault analyzes, are “a 
quite new form, virtually unknown in the eighteenth century, of institutional spatialization of disease 
[madness in the present case]” (20). In his analysis of the European context, the family is “[t]he 
natural locus of disease [and also] is the natural locus of life” as opposed to the hospital, which is an 
“artificial locus” (17). The larger idea is that the asylum at this time (early 1800s) was still a relatively 
new institution that reorganized traditional treatment channels even in England. British asylums in 
India were more or less modeled on European ones but with “concessions…made to local climactic 
factors, and, what is more, the quality and comfort of premises [that] varied considerably according 
to prospective inmates’ race and social class” (Ernst, 1991:68). Despite their prohibitively high costs, 
they were seen to serve two very important goals: “the protection of the Public on the one hand, and 
the relief of the most unhappy Class of human beings on the other.”41 The result was nothing 
consistent across India: the Bombay asylum was secluded and constructed in a horseshoe design that 
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made surveillance and maintenance efficient, the Madras asylum was shabby and resembled inferior 
army barracks, and the Calcutta asylum looked more like a city office that would be used to control 
the city, not its madmen.42 However, this would change over the next fifty to sixty years with the 
general move towards standardizing mental health treatment according to policies made in England.  
Most of the asylums in India also began the nineteenth century in the private hands of medical 
officers. We already mentioned that medicine was seen as a lucrative profit venture at this time, so 
imagination alone would suffice to suggest the detriment of the patients under the “care” of the 
madhouse owners. For example, officers would submit high provision bills to the board under the 
pretense of providing proper food and supplies for the patients, but even the Medical Board was not 
blind to the small quantities of food actually provided to the patients, concluding that “there was too 
much reason to believe that, on some occasions at least, the health and life (of the patients) was 
sacrificed for the avarice of the Surgeon.”43 As a quick note on scope, the Calcutta asylum in 1817 
confined only about thirty to forty patients; as discussed previously, the asylum was not particularly 
significant for the number of people it affected in its dire conditions.44 Nevertheless, the abuses of the 
asylum system did not go unnoticed, and one of the most important ways of increasing scrutiny and 
consistency was to place them into public hands instead.  
Madras and then Bombay were the first to de-privatize in 1808 and 1826, respectively, in 
order “to have a medical officer who had no financial interest in the running of the institution take 
charge of the asylum’s management” (Ernst, 1991:69). Only Calcutta remained in private hands until 
rather late, and it was owned by the same family from 1821 until 1856.45 One can sense a desire to 
care for and prevent abuses to the madmen behind this shift since it was motivated primarily by the 
injustices of the private madhouse owners against their patients, which aligned with the goals the 
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Court laid out as mentioned above. However, this presents two issues: for one, “whether an asylum 
was privately or publicly owned did not by itself determine conditions inside the institution, nor did 
it guarantee its cost efficiency” (Ernst, 1991:69). In fact, though publicizing the asylums did increase 
financial and management oversight, it also contributed to deteriorating quality of care, especially 
for lower-class patients.46 Once again, we can observe a clash between the legitimacy of the medical 
board and the ultimate authority of the asylum doctors as the arbiters of mental health care. 
It is impossible to miss the obsession with separating asylum patients by race and class, 
which became pronounced over this same period and whose effects can be felt even into the present 
day. Given that the British strongly wanted to distance themselves from the Indian subjects they 
ruled, it would be surprising indeed if the asylum were to be a point of unity between the races and 
the classes. The cleavages were most evident in the Bengal asylum, to which we will turn now. My 
main source material for this discussion will be Ernst’s paper, “Lunatic Asylums in Bengal.” 
The Bengal asylum, compared to that in Bombay or that in Madras, was particularly 
segregated by race; in fact, Indians and Europeans were placed in separate institutions altogether, 
not simply in different corners of the same building.47 The logic behind it seems straightforward 
enough – racial divisions in the asylums, especially in Bengal, mirrored the colonial separations that 
determined eligibility to participate in the government and other powerful activities. Indeed, Bengal 
was particularly notorious for separating “persons with ‘European habits’ from ‘Natives’” (Ernst, 
2006:74), so the asylum there naturally had relatively stronger racial divisions. Unsurprisingly, the 
inferior treatment, particularly in the form of meager food rations, went to the Natives.48  
What is not as apparent immediately is why the British would need to or want to separate 
based on class. The first reason, certainly the more superficial one, is the question of the Eurasians – 
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the “unwanted side-effects of what was perceived as overly close British-Indian relations.”49 Because 
they belonged neither with the Europeans nor the Indians and could be looked down upon by both 
groups (especially if they were poor),50 the factor of class was used to admit them into the asylums. 
The more profound reason is the attitude of the British toward their own paupers, madmen, and 
other “low-brow” people and their relationship to the colonial objective.  
As with any ruling or dominating group of people, the British needed to maintain a very 
formidable self-image, and evidence to the contrary would undermine their colonial government’s 
authority. Hence, the ruling elite were particularly concerned about their own lower-class members 
and felt a strong need to conceal their existence from the Indians. This naturally translated into using 
class as a factor in asylum admission, and British madmen (especially if they were lower-class) would 
be repatriated at least once a year51 in order to keep them away from the Indian public eye. Once 
again, it should be noted that in terms of absolute numbers, this phenomenon was not particularly 
significant as the European asylum in Calcutta held around a hundred European inmates around the 
late 1850s, and Madras and Bombay held a tenth of that number.52 However, it is important for the 
larger attitudes of colonial rule that it suggests. 
On the issue of race, I would like to take a moment to focus on the European asylum 
population because within it, a significant divide existed between the experiences of the military 
personnel and the civilians. For lunatics from the military, who made up the majority of the European 
asylum population, “[c]onfinement in the madhouse was in many cases merely one step amongst 
several in a sequence of institutionalization” (Ernst, 1991:120). For example, military asylum 
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patients had often been transferred between military duty, the hospital, and the prison, and their 
repeated institutionalization was frequently a result of rigorous oversight and monitoring. Civilians, 
on the other hand, often ended up in the asylums because they lacked a strong network of family or 
friends who could assume responsibility for the patients’ deviant behavior.53 Hence, even within the 
European asylum population, the asylum held different significances for different groups: in the case 
of the military members, the asylum was part of a network of institutions committed to controlling 
and concealing nonconforming behavior that would make the British appear weak of mind or 
behavior. Conversely, the asylum served as the recourse for mental health care for the European 
civilians who had no care network otherwise. The tension between institutionalization due to care 
and support versus the lack thereof will resurface in our discussion of the contemporary Indian 
context using Sarah Pinto’s ethnography. If nothing else, this suggests at least that the asylum cannot 
be simply reduced to a symbol of colonial oppression and control but rather served several crucial 
functions with respect to different populations. 
We have mentioned several times that the experience of mental health treatment depended 
not so much on the medical board’s guidelines or ideals but rather the approaches of individual 
doctors, and the Bengal asylum is no exception. By doctors, I should clarify that I mean asylum 
superintendents, who “determined the extent of comfort and care provided for inmates” (Ernst, 
2006:64); Indian sub-assistants were responsible for implementing the decisions of the 
superintendents. In terms of power structure, the superintendents were European surgeons or 
assistants responsible for the administration of a wide geographic area; as such, they could not 
possibly spend most of their time working in the asylums themselves. However, by single-handedly 
deciding on food and other provisions for the asylum inmates, they were primarily responsible for 
asserting colonial power structures concerning mental health treatment54 and could quite literally 
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choose whether patients lived or died since death patterns closely followed dietary adjustments55 
(reduced diets clearly led to more deaths). While many a superintendent’s choices did have 
deleterious effects on the patients, such as in the cases of Surgeon G. Paton56 or Dr. Payne,57 there 
were occasionally doctors who prescribed more salubrious regimes, such as Dr. J. Sutherland.58 This 
may be because of the unusual affection he held for his patients, taking care to learn most of their 
names and personalities.59 In this capacity, the asylum superintendent was the arbiter of colonial 
authority, and more often than not, his powers were not used to truly care for the patients.  
On the topic of race and class, one quick note ought to be mentioned. The standard narrative 
suggests a hardening of racial attitudes over the course of the 1800s due in large part to the Sepoy 
Mutiny of 1857 and the subsequent takeover of the government by the English Crown in 1858. Ernst, 
however, suggests the opposite pattern may have been at play. She cites the example of the Begum 
of Mysore,60 who was a “native” admitted into a European asylum based on high social standing. This 
would suggest that the Raj was more concerned with social image than racial purity, which is not 
senseless based on the previous discussion of British attitudes towards the European poor and mad. 
Most likely, the Begum displayed behavior that was in line with British ideas of “proper,” hence her 
admission into a superior asylum. Underlying this may be the notion that even Indians could outgrow 
their supposed inferiority to an extent with British manners and customs. 
At this point, we have developed in detail an understanding of the system of asylums that the 
British introduced in colonial India. I would like to reiterate and contextualize several key themes 
throughout the history of the asylums over the course of the 1800s. To begin with, the superficial 
purpose of the asylum was to treat those displaying madness, where “madness…is behavior that 
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deviates from some posited norm…behaviors and experiences that [are] perceive[d] as abnormal” 
(Hyne-Sutherland 10). In other words, the asylums served to control socially deviant behaviors. 
However, the asylum in its incipient stages was motivated more profoundly by two factors: a 
widespread understanding among the British of their own cultural “superiority,” and the promise of 
making quick money as a surgeon or asylum doctor in British India. The notion that India needed 
civilizing and westernization to outgrow its “pre-European…despotic rule and barbarism” served as 
a basic British assumption (Ernst, 1991:17). However, lunacy policy naturally came to reflect the 
diversity of personal ideological positions among the officers in India. For example, Lord Falkland 
supported ample investment in asylums and mental health provisions due to his “humanitarian”61 
attitude while others found his proposals spending money on less necessary systems. In addition, the 
Utilitarianism of James and John Stuart Mill found expression in the building of a large-scale asylum 
in Bombay in place of several patchy ones in 1820.62 Even the treatment that patients received varied 
principally on the attitudes of the superintendents in charge, who set food and provision quantities. 
The larger idea is that the first half of the nineteenth century saw a great diversity of thought and 
approaches to the asylums.  
When we assert that the asylums served to control socially deviant behaviors, we can identify 
two senses in which they may play this role, according to Hyne-Sutherland: 
[W]e can distinguish two different frameworks on opposite ends of a spectrum for describing 
what madness is. Most definitions will not engage solely with one framework or the other, 
but rather lie somewhere in the middle…When one chooses to define madness through the 
assumption that the condition is synonymous with the person who has it, as in the case of 
“mentally ill person” and unmatta, it is frequently the case that the purpose of the definition 
is to establish the relationship of the person to society in general…The alternative is to choose 
to define madness as a separate entity, one that someone can have or show signs of, but not 
something that fundamentally defines who they are vis-à-vis their family or society…[T]he 
choice of framework depends on the function of the definition: if the definition serves to 
protect the social body and maintain the status quo, it is frequently the case that an 
identification of a person with madness is sufficient…On the other hand, if the definition 
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serves to protect individuals to whom madness is ascribed – to legislate rights for them or to 
cure them from illness – then there is a separation of the person from the problem. (99-101) 
This distinction is important because it helps us assess the congruency between the 
intentions of the British in establishing the asylums versus the actual treatment provided there. We 
mentioned previously that both public protection and patient protection were goals of the British 
asylum system,63 so it may appear as though their framework fell in the middle of the spectrum 
described above. However, I would argue that at the core, the British tended to see lunatics as 
identical with their madness such that in order to control the insanity, they needed to control the 
lunatics. The absence of formal legislation protecting the rights of the mad and the absence of 
standardized, salubrious treatment approaches combined with the fact that treatments rarely 
depended on the cause assigned to the madness suggests that the illness was not distinguished from 
the person whom it afflicted. Put another way, curing patients may have been the ideal for higher 
level officers and the medical boards, certainly in part because the reputation of the boards depended 
on curing patients (with the understanding that what it meant to “cure” a mental patient had no 
consistent meaning).  
However, the image of the asylum that we have based on Ernst’s research points to the 
opposite reality – asylum superintendents were notorious for pushing their patients to the limits of 
what their bodies could handle, often resulting in patient deaths. Joined with the basic assumption of 
madness afflicting the brain, the central organ controlling behavior, it seems unlikely that a 
significant number of doctors would have considered the madness separately from the patient. 
Furthermore, the passing around of European military lunatics from one institution to another gives 
no reason to believe that their madness was singled out for treatment in a mental health facility; 
rather, the fact of their socially problematic behavior was the key, so it made little difference in a 
sense whether such patients were confined in a prison or asylum. Such evidence leads to the 
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conclusion that the British asylum agenda was primarily about protection of the society and the 
status quo and not about alleviating affliction for the patients or their families. Viewed in this way, 
the authority of society generally to impose its dominant order superseded the authority of those in 
charge who may have truly wished to provide for the patients’ benefit. 
The mid-1850s nevertheless represent an important shift with the de-privatization of the 
major asylums and close supervision of conditions in accordance with the Indian Lunatic Asylum Act. 
Even though the Act “aimed at preventing one of the threats most dreaded by the Victorians: wrongful 
confinement,” it did not substantially alter the relationships established between the patients, mental 
illness, and society (Ernst, 1991:45). Even through the 1987 passage of the Mental Health Act, the 
fundamental public security approach to madness still would not be altered.64 
 Perhaps the greatest significance of the asylums, however, is their function as a medium of 
colonial power. While Ernst would caution us from the “generalizing assertion that ‘medical power’ 
and ‘colonial power’ worked hand in hand,” I would declare that these two forces did indeed work 
together, though perhaps not in all cases (2006:73). On one level, the asylums, which were 
themselves a sort of work-in-progress through the 1800s, can be counted along with other 
institutions like schools and jails as symbols of British superiority over “native” Indians. The mere 
existence of such “brick-and-mortar manifestations of British patriotic pride and self-satisfaction 
[that were] intended to be awe-inspiring to the indigenous population…was one of the proofs of 
moral and social progress and of the superb character of western civilization and rationality” (Ernst, 
1991:64). Even though the asylums did not affect very many people in terms of absolute numbers, 
the symbolic power they had over the Indians was enormous, and their existence reinforced a 
positive feedback look of British ethnocentrist attitudes. For example, however controversial the 
asylums and medical doctors were internally, the colonial elite could still marvel at their 
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constructions as examples of the humanitarian work being done by British hands (I say “internally” 
to mean within the British community since several groups, like the Tukes, found the medical 
approaches to madness useless in favor of moral therapy methods). This contributed to a further 
strengthening of the British self-image, which further justified such costly ventures. 
Finally, the asylums represented the British colonial response to the pathologizing of socially 
errant behaviors – by considering the mental illness as practically synonymous with the patients, the 
answer became a type of “out of sight, out of mind.” Especially in the case of the European lunatics, 
the colonial rulers had a vested interest in hiding the lunatics from the general public so as to 
preserve the image of the British as a formidable government. The structure of the asylums mirrored 
this desire because many of the asylums would be located outside of main city centers and out of the 
public eye. The haphazard approach on average to treating mental illness, certainly prior to the 
1850s, suggests that curing the disease itself was not the primary concern but rather the suppression 
of unwanted behaviors in whatever form necessary. 
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THE ADVENT OF A COLONIAL FRAMEWORK ON MEDICINE  
 I would like to suggest now a temporary departure from the treatment of mental illness and 
the asylum system as we move into the early 1900s to revisit Āyurveda and analyze how it was 
affected by colonial rule since a significant portion of our earlier discussion of mental illness and its 
treatment was under the umbrella of Āyurveda. Understanding the ways it was shaped by colonialism 
will help provide context for present-day medicine and treatment of mental illness in India. What we 
will find is that British disregard for Ayurvedic medicine did not erase the tradition but rather 
contributed to its revival decades later in certain ways. The majority of my discussion in this section 
will be based on Rachel Berger’s book titled Āyurveda Made Modern.  
 Several noteworthy trends surface as we examine the pressures Āyurveda and its 
practitioners faced with the advent of Western biomedicine. First, the question of theory versus 
practice is raised since Ayurvedic knowledge was traditionally maintained in Sanskrit,65 yet the day-
to-day administration of Ayurvedic treatments involved little interaction with the Sanskrit texts 
themselves (by this time, we have evidence that the practice of Āyurveda was not correlated exactly 
with the texts, and quotidian treatment would have used vernacular languages). Second, a vital 
question of authority emerges as several groups attempted to lay claim to Āyurveda and its fate. 
Finally, the politicization of Āyurveda takes on new forms as great efforts are undertaken to 
understand the proper role it should play in the medical scheme of the colonial government. My 
approach through this, consistent with the rest of my thesis, will be primarily analytical. Hence, I do 
not venture to construct a detailed historical account of the developments in Ayurvedic medicine. As 
a result, the facts presented may appear patchy and disjointed. The purpose is to engage them in a 
discussion of power structures and pressures on the existing medical framework. 
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 That said, I would like to first clarify some terminology used above, namely “biomedical” and 
“biomoral.” Throughout the colonial period, Western medicine is cast as “biomedical” while Āyurveda 
is seen as “biomoral” (at least according to Berger’s study and sources). These terms, though they 
appear rather innocuous on the surface, convey a fair bit about the imperial conception of Indian 
medicine. In general, as we have seen already, the British colonial mindset was one in which they 
located themselves at the center of progress. Hence, the “moral” undertones of Āyurveda, especially 
among British medical doctors, implied that the medical tradition had strong connections to local 
spiritual traditions and could be tainted by fields and phenomena other than pure medicine or 
science. The notion that Āyurveda was ultimately not based on the same principles of logic and 
reason on which Western medicine was grounded “mov[ed it] firmly out of the scope of rational 
medicine” (Berger, 2013:24). It was thus assumed to be “inappropriate and unreliable in the context 
of medical modernity” (Berger, 2013:24). For example, in 1916, the government asked the chief 
medical commissioner in each province about the condition of local medicine in order to determine 
if the practitioners and institutions should receive government aid. The chief commissioners 
responded by urging the government to withhold funding since “Āyurveda…fundamentally lacked 
awareness of surgery and of the circulatory system [and] practitioners lacked training and…practice 
could not be standardized” (Berger, 2013:71). What the commissioners seem to have been wanting 
was a medical system that was conceived in the same terms as the system with which they were 
familiar. Upon finding Āyurveda to be radically different (Āyurveda did not speak of the circulatory 
system as such but nonetheless had been treating Indians for centuries) and relatively regionalized, 
their immediate reaction was one of dismissal.  
  This underscores an interesting point about the way the British imperialists recognized 
Āyurveda. Among their ranks, individuals like Sir William Jones “lauded [Ayurevda]…as a key area of 
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Hindu philosophy and history,”66 going on to explain how the medical knowledge was delivered to 
humans by Brahmā and other deities with the “practical methods of curing diseases.”67 This 
unmistakably positive description appears to be at odds with the understanding that Āyurveda was 
“backwards” in its approaches and not founded on “true” science. Indeed, it may be that Jones was in 
a minority group given his particular designation as an Orientalist. Nevertheless, it is at least 
consistent with British exoticization of foreign cultures, which manifested itself in several forms, 
including the picturesque movement concerning visual art, sculpture, and music.68 Such descriptions, 
though positive, often turned a blind eye to the particular cultural contexts of the artifacts and 
concepts examined. With the present case, Āyurveda may have seemed fascinating to the Orientalist 
crowd. However, it was largely regarded by the Indian Medical Service69 as foreign and “defy[ing] 
categorization with no serious bearing on health care” towards the beginning of the twentieth 
century, roughly until the 1920s (Berger, 2013:74). Whatever categories were employed 
oversimplified the picture. For instance, in the context of collecting demographic information about 
the Indian population governed by the colonial power for uses beyond just medicine, the Raj 
“impos[ed] rigid colonial categories of personal and group identification [that ran] contrary to the 
complex processes of claiming identity and negated the possibility of intersectional identities in 
favour of a primary designation such as ‘Brahmin’ or ‘Tribal’” (Berger, 2013:52).   
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Another related key feature of British understanding of Āyurveda around the beginning of 
the twentieth century was a sharp divide between the theory of Āyurveda, mostly conceptualized in 
Sanskrit, and the day-to-day practice, which involved little Sanskrit but a much greater emphasis on 
local languages and contexts. The Sanskrit texts, such as the Carakasaṃhitā and the Suśrutasaṃhitā, 
were in the guardianship of the pandits and priests who could explain the full theory of Āyurveda. 
The practice and medical treatments themselves, however, were the territory of the vaids, who 
operated locally and whose medical training concentrated on treatment. The Orientalists, due to their 
focus on textuality and codified knowledge, interacted with the world of the pandits and learned 
about an Āyurveda that was not lived out; the medical commissioners operated more locally but still 
understood little of the actual practice of Āyurveda and probably did not care too much at the time, 
either.  
This raises an important question about the authority of the texts versus the authority of 
practice. In the British library and colonial government, the texts wholly spoke for what sort of a 
medical tradition Āyurveda was, and this pattern was not limited to Āyurveda. A similar phenomenon 
occurred with colonial understandings of the Law Code of Manu, which similarly came to stand in for 
the whole legal framework of Hinduism. Outside of the confines of the libraries and offices, however, 
the quotidian practice of Āyurveda dominated, and this dichotomy contributed to misunderstandings 
of Indian medicine. As a result, Āyurveda tended to be marginalized in politics and was not legally 
permitted to play a meaningful role. It is interesting to note, however, that especially in rural areas, 
the “legal” did not often dominate the local traditions that had been built up over the centuries as 
“Vaids…along with regional and local variations on the figure of the health practitioner, were 
predominantly responsible for doling out the implements of healing” (Berger, 2013:46).  
Around this time, the early 1920s, a fundamental shift occurred in the way the colonial 
medical agenda recognized Āyurveda. Once it came to the attention of the British in charge that 
Āyurveda was largely responsible for the treatment of people in rural areas, it became incorporated 
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into the larger colonial mission of disseminating medical treatment to the Indian population. Rather 
than try to fight the tradition as incomprehensible and altogether unscientific, the Raj found ways to 
creatively harness its pragmatic role in society and engage it as a conduit for the colonial 
government’s own medical agenda. Put another way, Āyurveda for the first time came under the 
serious radar of the colonial government, which strove to use it for its own purposes. In terms of the 
divide between textuality and practice, the lived practice was suddenly afforded a new importance 
but not in its own right – as will become evident, it was crucial for the fulfilment of the purposes of 
the British medical agenda. With a focus on the actual practice, naturally, the practitioner himself 
became the center of the debate on Indian medicine, essentially “[giving] the colonial government 
access to the current state of the indigenous medical systems, where the Pandit had only been able 
to provide insight into its theoretical meaning in a broader civilizational context” (Berger, 2013:75). 
Textual authority gave way to the authority of practice, yet ironically, this did not mean that the vaids 
were suddenly responsible for managing the health of the population though it could be said they 
“finally entered the age of modern medical bureaucracy” in 1923 (Berger, 2013:73). Rather, they 
were engaged as cogs in the larger machine of the colonial government.  
Naturally, this shift involved a dismantling of deeply rooted ideas about an Āyurveda that was 
“inescapably ancient” (Berger, 2013:55). The Society for the Resuscitation of Indian Literature’s book 
in 1899 titled Āyurveda; or the Hindu System of Medical Science70 is one perfect example as it 
presented Āyurveda as “timeless…[and] divorced from contemporary medical experience.”71 Yet, as 
we have seen, this was not the case because Āyurveda had indeed evolved dramatically to meet the 
medical needs of the Indian population. Nevertheless, as early as 1895, there were genuine efforts on 
the colonial government’s part to investigate the uses of native drugs. For instance, the Indigenous 
Drugs Committee, through its concern for public health outside of the context of any specific practice 
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of medicine, “resulted in a survey of medical knowledge and those who held it” (Berger, 2013:51-51). 
The committee put forth several recommendations that led to the development of an industry for 
indigenous drugs in India. Its proposal included the suggestion that “definite pharmacological 
preparations of certain indigenous drugs…be made at the Medical Store Depots for distribution to 
the various hospitals and dispensaries for trial and report.”72 Nevertheless, racially influenced 
imperial attitudes persisted, and a greater weight on indigenous drugs did not translate into a 
genuine respect for those who possessed them. Indeed, the committee prized the drugs but slandered 
the informants, framing the “traditional practitioner as a figure who had merely stumbled upon a 
great find, but who was unequipped to make valuable use of it” (Berger, 2013:59). Put differently, 
this instinct to view indigenous practitioners as quacks resulted in the colonial system “[holding] up 
the value of Indian botanical material while denigrating the systems that had traditionally organized 
this knowledge” (Berger, 2008:102-103). 
The recognition of how Ayurvedic medicine was really administered to the population finds 
itself under the overall trend on the part of the colonial government of shifting medical authority to 
the provinces, essentially turning medical provision into a national objective that would be 
implemented locally. The shift is perhaps best represented in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 
1919-1921 and the effects of WWI, and it brought with it “a softening in the official attitude toward 
indigenous medicine” (Berger, 2008: 104). The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was the product of 
conversations between Montagu (the Secretary of State for India) and Chelmsford (Viceroy of India), 
and the principal recommendation was that some aspects of provincial governance should be shifted 
over to Indian ministers.73 In short, it is part of the trend of “Indianization” of health care and put 
more emphasis on the provinces. It likely was not the case that the Raj dramatically revised its 
ideology and mission; rather, one compelling but perhaps incomplete explanation holds that the war 
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placed a significant financial strain on medical services and resources, so it became much more 
fiscally sensible to engage with the existing structures of medical treatment rather than rebuild the 
networks from scratch. These existing structures included principally the local practitioners and, to 
some extent, indigenous medicine. The move towards provincialization provided more responsibility 
of basic health care to regional officials, who were less well-qualified and knowledgeable, but it also 
outlined more lucidly the expectations of accountability to the local population that was much more 
difficult to treat under the national sweep of the Indian Medical Service. In essence, as Berger 
describes the shift, “pragmatism had to outweigh colonial ideology, and systems already in place 
could not be ignored” (Berger, 2008:104). 
The early twentieth century was, without a doubt, one of the most transformative time 
periods for Āyurveda. The turn of the decade around 1930 brought several shifts in the role Āyurveda 
played. One of the broadest changes is that the practitioner, previously disregarded and suppressed, 
became the center of debate regarding Āyurveda, and along with this came a standardization of 
Ayurvedic medical practice, so to speak. It is also around this time that nationalist sentiments 
prominently asserted themselves in the discourse of medicine.  
 One of the most fundamental changes to Āyurveda was in the legitimization of Āyurveda 
practitioners – how vaids were trained and how they gained credibility with the population. The local 
governments’ need for a standardized, professional system of local medicine led in time to the 
creation of institutions to prepare Ayurvedic professionals, such as a department for Ayurvedic 
medicine at the Benares Hindu University.74 The courses taught mirrored the style of Western 
medicine courses – “examinations, a dictated notion of progression from subject to subject, and little 
hands-on experience [that was] counter to the traditional process of learning” (Berger, 2008:106). 
While local practitioners themselves may have also felt that the degree course provided additional 
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credibility, this shift challenged the core of Āyurveda’s transmission of medical knowledge. 
Traditionally, students would learn as apprentices under their teacher, gaining a vast range of hands-
on experiences in their local contexts. The shift to institutions (modeled after Western structures) as 
the purveyors of authority could be seen also as part of a move to make Āyurveda more universal 
and less geographically specific.  
One may be tempted to think that this would bolster the legitimacy of Indian medicine by 
granting it the same reach that the Western system held, but there are important subtleties to 
consider. One result of the move to institutions, usually located in urban centers, was “the further 
marginalization of rural-based, untrained medical practitioners who did not conform to the system” 
(Berger, 2008:106). If rural traditional practitioners were frowned upon in the past as quacks, then 
their situation grew much worse because they didn’t even have a degree in this “quack” medicine (I 
should clarify, however, that such a harsh stance towards Āyurveda had softened by this point, and I 
use such jarring language to emphasize the point rather than convey a fact). An added challenge to 
these rural practitioners was a financial divide between them and the degree-certified vaids. The 
courses necessary to become qualified in the eyes of the colonial government (and arguably other 
[urban] vaids as well) involved a great financial investment, which led itself to a positive feedback 
loop. Those with money could train to become degree-certified vaids; their degrees would ensure 
that their income would be significantly higher and that they would have the rights to issue death 
and medical certificates, a “trade that provided a more lucrative option than merely treating illness 
or vending medicines” (Berger, 2008:106).  
Earlier, we saw that there existed an important divide between the pandit as the guardian of 
the formalized Ayurvedic writings in Sanskrit and the vaid practicing Āyurveda locally in the 
vernaculars. In relation to the colonial state, this resulted in an inconsistency between what Āyurveda 
was “supposed to be” according to the Indians (specifically, the pandits) themselves (the British 
mostly regarded it as tenuous anyway) and how it was actually practiced. As the vaid became the 
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center of discourse, the two sides came closer together because the “practitioner as the arbiter of 
tradition [was] resonant socially through his reliance on modern Hindi…and culturally resonant 
through his reliance on textuality” (Berger, 2013:82). He had both the authority to speak for 
Āyurveda as a medical system, and he could interact with ordinary Indians without “reliance on the 
‘religious’ infrastructure…[and the] formality involved in these encounters [with pandits]” (Berger, 
2013:82). The vaid also became the vehicle through which the colonial state was able to access the 
current state of Āyurveda, and his new role as center spokesperson is perhaps best represented in 
the emergence of medical pamphlets that combined a medical discourse with a nationalist one.  
 For some background, this time period saw the development of a Hindi-speaking middle class 
in North India.75 In order to be able to gain more control in the public sphere, however, this new 
middle class needed to be able to read and write in the context of the publishing industry that had 
become established by the early 1920s, and medical discourse constituted a considerable portion of 
the pamphlet material generated. In this scheme, authority naturally rested with the authors of these 
pamphlets, many of whom were vaids, since the criteria for legally writing literature that would be 
circulated in the public sphere were not as stringent as the requirements to be a recognized 
practitioner in the eyes of the colonial government. As Berger writes, “scientific information coupled 
with ideological learning could construct authority” (Berger, 2008:108).  
 What purpose did these pamphlets play, and why did they become a commonplace source of 
basic medical advice? At the base, this medium was easily accessible in Hindi requiring no mediation 
of doctor or priest. Secondly, it was also a medium through which relatively “unqualified” individuals 
could also express their opinions. Most importantly, however, is the sense of nationalism that 
underlay these writings, so much so that the “new authors were Indians first, in body and in politic, 
and vaids or authors or entrepreneurs second” (Berger, 2013:105). The larger goal was to lay the 
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foundations for an authentically Indian state – one that would be stripped of its colonial and generally 
foreign aspects. Insofar as medicine was concerned in this framework, indigenous Indian medicine 
was considered the ideal for treating Indians. This was not to suggest that Western biomedicine was 
bad or dangerous; rather, it was meant for Westerners, not Indians. The racialization of medicine, 
potentially to be understood as part of the colonial state’s agenda, becomes clear in the 1925 
Āyurveda guide of Shyamsundar Sharma, who appeals to differences in climate to emphasize the 
need to treat Indian bodies with Indian medicine.76 Ironically, though, these guides to Āyurveda 
contained very little of Ayurvedic principles as found in the texts, such as assessing the body 
holistically through the lens of the humors, focusing more on treatment of a specific illness, which 
could be considered the typical biomedical approach. In a sense, they were not meant to illuminate 
the medical theories of Āyurveda; rather, they are a testament to the interwoven quality of medicine 
and nationalism at a time when many Indians felt like their own homeland was not under their own 
control and needed a return to a glorious, perhaps imagined, past. In trying to assert the connections 
between Indian medicine, Āyurveda, Indian spirituality, Hinduism, and the Indian body, these 
authors attempted to paint the image of a modern India as a country of healthy, middle-class citizens, 
usually imagined as Hindus, living in satisfaction according to modernized Vedic principles.77  
This above section attempts to gain clarity on the larger trends of politicization of medicine 
in the subcontinent in the first four decades of the twentieth century. I would like to briefly 
summarize some of the authority relationships implied in the politicization of Āyurveda. One of the 
first questions that arose when the British came into contact with the Ayurvedic medical tradition 
and that persists into the modern age is that of legitimate medicine – who gets to determine what is 
“objective” medical science? It appears that the colonial state had a very rigid understanding of what 
it meant to have proper knowledge about the human body, including a conception of the circulatory 
                                                          
76 See S. Sharma, Ayurved-Mahantva (Lucknow: 1925), 13, quoted in Berger, 2008:109fn22 
77 See Berger, 2008:112 
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system and surgery. By their standards, Āyurveda did not constitute true biomedicine and was thus 
termed biomorality instead. This was ignoring the fact that Ayurvedic practitioners had indeed 
gathered a lot of valuable information about local herbs and remedies over the centuries and had 
developed fairly cogent treatment networks. When Āyurveda became institutionalized and moved 
away from the local sphere into a standardized urban environment, it gained some legitimacy within 
the colonial system as a rigorous medical system that has the capacity to train individuals to become 
qualified to ensure the health of the population. Yet ironically, in order for it to attain a higher 
reputation, it had to shed the traditional system of apprenticeship in favor of the allopathic-style 
degree course. 
As Āyurveda moved away from the traditional local focus, one can see the question raised of 
what kind of authority a medical system has. For centuries, Āyurveda seemed to have answered that 
medicine ought to be locally focused. This was the natural result of the high costs of transmitting 
information across large stretches of land. However, by the middle of the twentieth century, local 
medical authority was deliberately cast as part of the Indian nationalist ideal – Indian medicine for 
Indian bodies. Claiming Āyurveda as ideal for Indians revealed a desire of middle-class Indians to 
gain more authority over their own bodies and asked the question of what it meant to understand 
the body in indigenous terms. For decades, colonial surveys and surveillance of the Indian population 
“had a hegemonic effect on the conceptualization of the Indian body” (Berger, 2013:52). If Āyurveda 
could be engaged more prominently in mainstream discussions of the body, then it would become a 
way for Indians to understand their bodies in Indian terms once again.  
Finally, one can ask the question of who gets to use Āyurveda. It had mostly been the case 
that the vaid held authority over the actual practice while the pandits preserved the Sanskrit texts of 
the tradition. The British initially maintained this system, though they mostly ignored the domain of 
the vaid. When they began gaining a deeper understanding of indigenous medicine, it was as though 
they claimed authority over the medical knowledge that Ayurvedic healers had developed over the 
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centuries. It became necessary for the colonial state to legitimize Ayurvedic medicine, whose herbal 
remedies it framed as a discovery of its own. Nevertheless, the cultural value that Āyurveda held with 
the average Indian legitimized it as a tradition at a time it was being marginalized by the British, and 
the trust placed in the vaid by local populations ensured that Āyurveda would survive well into the 
modern age though it would take on new meanings.  
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TOWARDS A MODERN INSTITUTION 
 Previously, we delved into great detail describing the colonial asylum structure, the British 
response during the nineteenth century to the need to control nonconforming behaviors and to 
enforce the myth of colonial superiority, followed by a lengthy discussion of Āyurveda’s transition 
into the modern era and the ways it interacted with colonial rule generally speaking. We left off 
around the 1930s, when Āyurveda came under greater scrutiny by the colonial government, 
especially in order to use it for the Raj’s medical administration purposes. This section will attempt 
to bring these two themes together, perhaps somewhat artificially, in the discussion of the transition 
from the asylum structure to the modern mental hospital. The Ranchi Indian Mental Hospital, “the 
largest public psychiatric facility in colonial India in the 1920s and 1930s,” will be used as a case 
study to draw broader conclusions about the nature of insanity treatment in India and the integration 
of indigenous treatments into the Western medical structure (Ernst, 2014:xvii). This discussion will 
also lay the foundation for the final section analyzing the treatment of madness in contemporary 
India. 
 Rather than go into great depth about the intricacies of the transition to the modern hospital, 
I prefer to focus on themes and bring in finer details as necessary. That said, I will focus on several 
major ideas: the process of Indianization, nationalism, racial inequities, treatments, and symbolism. 
The asylums, we mentioned, were significant principally because they were a symbol of 
colonial authority, both over the patients confined within as well as the land and its culture that was 
under British control. The hospital in some ways retained the colonial mindset but transferred more 
authority to Indians in a process known as “Indianization,” which coincided roughly with the 
decentralization that came with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Naturally, due to the fundamental 
change in the way the Raj controlled and administered medical care for Indians, many questions 
arose regarding the power that ethnic Indians would possess. Ernst describes it as follows: 
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Foremost among these [issues and questions] is whether members of the gradually emerging 
group of Indians in senior positions should be most appropriately pigeonholed as mere 
collaborators with the colonial project, who fulfilled Macaulay’s earlier nineteenth-century 
vision of the British colonial state and its educational institutions of raising an Indian middle 
class that could interpret ‘between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons 
Indian in colour and blood, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.’78 
(2014:2) 
Such questions are closely related to the issues surrounding Āyurveda as a medical tradition 
in this time period. Essentially, Indians were curious to understand what it meant to be truly “Indian” 
after being ruled for close to two centuries by the British, and the British wondered how to meet 
Indian demands for self-authority but still remain in the top rungs of the power and authority 
pyramid. After so many years of cross-cultural interaction, it was practically impossible for Indians 
to return to the ideal laid out in much of the “lay” medical literature: Indians governing Indian bodies 
using traditionally Indian cultural artifacts, such as Ayurvedically-based treatment in the context of 
a modernized Vedic culture. In addition, it was understandably difficult for the British to relinquish 
control over so powerful a structure such as medical administration in India to people who were 
generally deemed inferior. Finally, the question of whether Indians could be “elevated” into British 
habits and values is evident in Macaulay’s statement and operates alongside the other issues raised 
above. 
Indianization here refers to the transferring of power and higher rank positions in the 
medical administration to Indians, such as Jal Edulji Dhunjibhoy, the superintendent of the Ranchi 
Mental Hospital. This shift can be seen as a product of Indian nationalism and self-governance 
because it became a way for Indians to take on greater authority roles within the medical system that 
was charged with their treatment. One could say that a significant transfer of power had occurred 
when Dhunjibhoy was appointed to the “coveted” position as the superintendent of such a new, 
expansive modern treatment facility (Ernst, 2014:3). His extensive Western education at the Bombay 
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Medical College was complemented by the utmost support of the Raj for his further training, and he 
had received numerous complements among medical professionals both in colonial India as well as 
in Britain.79 On the surface at least, there was evidence to suggest that the “official requirement for 
equity between European and Indian senior officers” had come to fruition and that Indian demands 
for self-governance and self-administration were being heeded. 
However, as with any racialized system, dismantling prejudice was going to take much longer. 
There are two arguments to be made here: for one, though Dhunjibhoy may have achieved a 
remarkably high position in the medical administration, he did battle against significant racism along 
the way through to the end of his career. Secondly, someone concerned with the issue of 
“authentically Indian” would point out that Dhunjibhoy was the medical equivalent of Macaulay’s 
vision for Indians – a man of “Indian…colour” but Western trained and working with primarily 
Western treatment methods in a Western-conceived institution.  
Prejudice against Indians took numerous forms, but I will examine only some of the more 
significant ones here.80 On one level, some Europeans worried that after such intimate contact for 
some centuries between the colonial power and its subjects, the subjects may be inescapably 
dependent on and inadequate without the colonial power. Later historians specializing in colonialism 
gave this idea significant weight,81 some scholars referring to it as the “comprador bourgeoisie.”82 
One can detect in this perhaps a willingness to afford the colonial subjects full human dignity and 
equality but also a consideration for the practical psychological effects of their situation under 
colonialism. Others downright pathologized entire communities of people. For example, Lt. Col. W. S. 
J. Shaw, who had been a superintendent of a hospital near Poona, considered the Parsi community, 
which had been held in special respect with the British compared to Hindus and Muslims, infected 
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with dementia praecox;83 Dhunjibhoy, being Parsi himself, was unsurprisingly out of favor with Shaw. 
It is important to note that in general, racial theories still held considerable weight, and one could 
even argue for separating the “racial hygiene” theories of individuals like Shaw and the “mental 
hygiene” theories of those like Dhunjibhoy (Ernst, 2014:14). This is to say that the proper division of 
and distance between races, embodied in the ideas of Shaw, occupied almost an equally legitimate 
space as the treatment of mental illness, which appears to be the primary concern of doctors like 
Dhunjibhoy. Embedded in “racial hygiene,” unlike in the “comprador bourgeoisie,” was a notion that 
Indians were inescapably subordinate to the British rulers, no matter “their formal positions and 
achievements within the imperial order” (Ernst, 2014:14).  
At this point, we have identified three important, related but different ideas of the racial 
divisions between the Indians and the British – it is key to focus on their understandings of racial 
equality and the implications for rising Indian doctors like Dhunjibhoy. Macaulay, on one hand, 
seemed to believe that Indians could become equal to the British by adopting British customs and 
tastes; in twenty-first-century America, this would be called colloquially a “coconut”84 – “brown” on 
the outside (“Indian in colour and blood”) but “white” on the inside (“English in tastes, in opinions, 
in morals, and in intellect”). However, Indians would not be considered inherently equal in this 
framework since they would need to be “brought into”85 the British idiom. The “comprador 
bourgeoisie”86 idea suggested a true equality of the races underlying an imposed imperial order that 
had made one race dependent on the other – in practice, this meant that it would be unwise to grant 
Indians full equality and control over the Indian medical administration. Finally, Shaw’s 
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understanding of “racial hygiene” maintains an inequality between Indians and British regardless of 
how “Westernized” and well-regarded by Westerners the Indian doctors may have been.  
It is clear that despite the diversity of opinion on racial differences, hardly a prominent 
thinker advocated on behalf of the Indian doctors; indeed, Arthur Brock, active in the field of 
sociology, “put his finger on Shaw’s underlying agenda and was discredited for it by reference to his 
lack of Indian experience” (Ernst, 2014:13). This meant Dhunjibhoy and others like him had an 
especially steep slope to work against, and it would be no surprise that “Indians practising indigenous 
medicine [would be] relegated to the bottom rungs” (Ernst, 2014:6). As a side note, one can wonder 
whether the racism was entirely internally produced or whether economic success played a partial 
role – certainly European doctors vying for career opportunities were in competition not only with 
other Europeans but also with European-trained Indians and, to a much lesser extent, Indians 
practicing indigenous medicine. Most likely, however, given the prevalence of racial discrimination 
throughout the Raj over the centuries, professional competition added merely another layer of 
resistance to Indianization. 
Allow me to digress briefly – I would like to say a quick word about the relevance of the 
questions raised in the process of Indianization – I made specific reference to “coconut” above in a 
relatively recent news article from 2014 because the fundamental issue has all but disappeared. 
Indians (as with Mexicans and Afro-Caribbeans in their respective communities) are still answering 
the question of what it means to be truly “Indian” and just how deep ethnic identities run. We can 
observe a spectrum of “Indianness” threading together the various positions we have encountered – 
on one end, “Indian” meant having the brown skin and ancestry described by Macaulay, appearing to 
be from the Indian subcontinent outwardly, while adopting the customs of the British. On the 
opposite end lay the beliefs of the Ayurvedic pamphlet authors and the rising Hindi-speaking middle 
class under the slogan of “Indian medicine for Indian bodies.” Indian nationalism insisted that in 
order to be truly “Indian,” one ought to have adopted traditionally Indian cultural practices, such as 
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the use of Āyurveda in place of the biomedicine brought by the imperial government. In this schema, 
driving out colonial rule involved also driving out the cultural products, including medicine, that 
came with it.   
In any case, such persistent racial attitudes on the part of the British translated into numerous 
structural inequities under the guise of equality; a couple of examples of Dhunjibhoy’s hospital at 
Ranchi and its relationship to the European Mental Hospital of Englishman Berkeley-Hill situated 
nearby will suffice. For one, due to the actions of European advocacy groups, the European Medical 
Hospital received funding from the central government, saving it from the “underfunding and 
deterioration of services” that afflicted Dhunjibhoy’s institution (Ernst, 2014:10). In addition, the 
British were generally held to a different standard of acceptable speech – Berkeley-Hill as a European 
could get away with his mockery of his seniors, and his “cantankerous [reputation]…does not appear 
to have done him much harm in terms of his professional career” (Ernst, 2014:11). On the other hand, 
the Indian doctors could easily come under suspicion of disloyalty if they criticized the “systemic 
prejudice and parochial narrow-mindedness” they were so often subject to (Ernst, 2014:11).  
Moving away now from the divide between theoretical equality and practical inequity, I 
would like to discuss the treatments administered at Ranchi and their connections to the earlier 
methods in the asylums and to Ayurvedic treatments that claimed authority over much of rural India. 
It is important to keep in mind that Ranchi Indian Mental Hospital was a unique urban institution 
that was a direct product of colonial developments in India and is thus a natural extension of or 
progression from the notorious asylums. However, it also partially bridges the divide between 
Ayurvedic and biomedical treatments that occupied a significant space in the discourses of Āyurveda 
in the early twentieth century.  
A discussion of the treatments in the modern Indian hospital raises many questions about the 
integrity of indigenous medicine, which was now much more prominent compared to the early 
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twentieth century thanks to both the passionate nationalist discourses with which it was intertwined 
as well as the gradual recognition by British medical officers of the potential value of Ayurvedic 
treatments. Dhunjibhoy could be described on the whole as eclectic in his approach to treatment, 
which “was flexibly cosmopolitan and transnational and cannot adequately be captured by reference 
to any single approach, let alone be restricted to ‘colonial psychiatry’” (Ernst, 2014:206). He himself 
said that “[w]e introduce all the latest approved Western methods of treatment with due regard to 
Eastern conditions.”87 While this included what we may call the horrific treatments of shock therapy 
and extended sedation, recent developments in the Occident, he also experimented with indigenous 
Indian herbs and remedies, such as sweet basil and Indian snakeroot.88 Such herbs were fairly 
common among Ayurvedic practitioners, and they provided often cheaper alternatives to European 
remedies. Here, we see resurfacing a theme we mentioned earlier: Āyurveda became more acceptable 
to the European-trained medical professionals when it became evident that its remedies would be a 
more cost-effective alternative.  
However, Ernst asks us to be careful in suggesting that Dhunjibhoy was very open-minded to 
Ayurvedic treatments – while it is difficult to establish a case either way, it is possible that he 
considered indigenous herbal remedies acceptable for rural areas but overall outmoded and 
unscientific for a such a modern hospital as his.89 What we can conclude, however, is that the earlier 
disconnect between Indian medicine and British biomedicine had given way to a more robust 
interaction between the two systems. Nevertheless, British doctors’ perceptions of Āyurveda still 
exhibited the range of opinions as before, though perhaps the distribution may have shifted a little in 
favor of Āyurveda based on the evidence from Ranchi. Some professionals, for example, “support[ed] 
legislation aimed at institutionalising traditional medical systems…along Western lines by making 
them subject to scientific scrutiny [while] [o]thers objected to any recognition being given to what 
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they saw as un-improvable, outmoded and unscientific practices” (Ernst, 2014:175). The criticism of 
Āyurveda as unscientific persisted in general, but some doctors felt it would be worthwhile to adopt 
into a European framework certain effective remedies developed in the indigenous tradition.  
We have thus far limited our discussion of treatments to the somatic realm, but the Ranchi 
hospital also engaged various “moral” (or at least non-somatic) treatments, though it is difficult to 
say whether these were linked to the ideas of the Tukes in the earlier asylum period or whether these 
were the natural result of global advances in psychiatry. For example, about half of the patients found 
treatment by occupational therapy in forms of gardening, carpentry, meal preparation, and so on. 
Such therapy provided an alternate to the “haze induced by medication,” allowing patients to 
experience more “normal” life, and it also accomplished work for the institution and ultimately, the 
state (Ernst, 2014:196). Work therapy in the way Dhunjibhoy instituted it also helped patients 
overcome their sensitivities to caste and other categories. Some other forms of non-somatic 
treatment were quite creative for the time90 and helped locate the Ranchi hospital within the larger 
nationalist discourse. For example, Dhunjibhoy, who was himself detached from nationalist politics91 
due to his identity as a Parsi, found dance therapy an appealing treatment after attending a 
demonstration of the Bratachari Movement in Calcutta, founded by G. S. Dutt.92 For Dutt, the dance 
movement served as a way of “breaking down social barriers of caste, religion, sex and age,” bringing 
Indians together in a shared sentiment of national identity (Ernst, 2014:191).  
On the other hand, other forms of therapy were tailored to patients’ individual identities, such 
as religious therapy involving religious discourses and feasts on holy days. Both of these forms of 
therapy juxtaposed point to the growing importance of treating mental illness both on an individual 
level with special attention to important dimensions of patients’ identities like religion as well as on 
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a communal level in order to allow patients to experience life within a society of many individuals 
without being isolated on the basis of their mental illness. Overall, to use Hyne-Sutherland’s 
framework once again, we can observe a shift towards locating mental illness in patients but not 
identical with their identities. The greater recognition for the patients’ well-being in areas such as 
religious fulfilment and occupational satisfaction afforded them an identity separate from their 
illness, unlike the case with the lunatic asylums from a hundred years earlier.  
In terms of authority questions, we have an interesting situation: the insanity of the patients, 
which we would ordinarily expect to exert control over the structuring of patients’ lives, was 
liberating in that it freed them from the roles they would have been expected to play under the 
authority of the dominant social order. In addition, work therapy freed the patients from the clutches 
of constant medication, which was the expression of the authority of the doctors wielding it. 
Nevertheless, one could ask whether the work therapy was a release or subjugation to the economic 
needs of the institution since “[i]ssues of exploitation and power can arise whenever vulnerable 
people are not fully recompensed for the value of their labour” (Ernst, 2014:193). In any case, within 
the authority exerted by the mental health institution generally, the modern hospital of Ranchi could 
be seen as granting the individual patients greater dignity over their own humanity, allowing them 
to experience more of the ordinary daily life they may have without their insanity but in the absence 
of social expectations based on class or caste.  
Finally, another point must not be forgotten – our entire discussion about the Ranchi hospital 
thus far has been based ultimately on the accounts of Dhunjibhoy’s life from the writings of his 
daughter, the personal accounts of the other British medical officers, and others involved in 
administering treatment at the hospital. Nowhere have we encountered a patient’s testimony – in a 
very real sense, “the account of the patient is silenced” (Ernst, 2014:93). Hence, even in the process 
of writing this thesis, we are affirming the authority of the institution and those involved in its 
functioning over the patients, but we have no alternative. The best we can do is imagine the patients’ 
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perspectives based on the institutional evidence that is available. Hence, it could be inevitably 
overbearing for us to conclude that patients found the modern hospital “friendly and homely”93 due 
to the innovative therapy methods and entertainment like croquet, tennis, and music.94 Evidence 
does suggest, though, that patients did appreciate such an atmosphere compared to the conditions 
they may have faced at home. 
Before bringing the themes from this section together, I would like to add one note about the 
importance of family. In pre-colonial times, family and friends were understood as the primary 
caretakers of the insane, the “natural locus” of disease due to the “gentle, spontaneous care, 
expressive of love” that is given primarily by close family members (Foucault 17). In the case of the 
asylum, we saw that depending on the type of lunatic, a supportive or an unsupportive family could 
be the reason for being brought to the asylum. Indeed, the relationship between the institution and 
the family is extremely complex; even in the case of Ranchi, it is likely there were some patients 
whose families institutionalized them out of hope of better care in the hospital while others were 
brought to the hospital in order to get rid of an undesirable family member.95 This theme will 
continue to thread its way through the section on modern Indian mental health treatment and will 
become even more visible. 
Michel Foucault analyzes the hospital as “an artificial locus in which the transplanted disease 
runs the risk of losing its essential identity” (17). This is to say that within the confines of the hospital, 
the disease would be treated and cease to exist or at least disappear. For a moment, I will gloss 
“hospital” as “asylum.” Examining the British lunatic asylums through this lens yields a surprising 
result – in theory, the asylums were intended to treat mental illness (though one could argue that the 
deeper intention was to hide socially deviant behavior in order to allow the colonial elite to better 
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exert their power), but the asylums became much more a symbol for the illness itself. Rather than 
lunacy “losing its essential identity” within the asylum walls, one could say it transferred its identity 
to the very institution that was erected to treat it. Even if the disease within did die or lose its 
“essential identity” (recall that it was very difficult to say whether a patient was truly “cured”96), it 
would live on through the symbol of the asylum; indeed, the symbolism persists to the present day. 
With the development of the modern mental hospital, however, Foucault’s analysis becomes more 
applicable. The hospital at Ranchi primarily did serve to treat mental illness and provide for the 
welfare of its patients, and this idea is one well worth keeping in mind as we move into modernity. 
At this point, I would like to review some of the salient themes from the process of 
Indianization of the colonial medical systems, which found “full success” in the Ranchi Indian Mental 
Hospital (Ernst, 2014:25).  At a broad level, Indianization is in large part a product of the nationalist 
discourse that shaped the indigenous Ayurvedic medical system and the fundamental notion of what 
it meant to be “truly Indian” and to free oneself from colonial power structures. Many Indians 
believed that in the medical social sphere, India had to return to an Ayurvedically-based 
administration to overthrow the colonial government. In this light, Dhunjibhoy, the superintendent 
of the Indian Mental Hospital at Ranchi and our focus for this section, did not break free from the 
colonial medical structure but rather worked from within it to combat systemic racism and prejudice. 
While he was Western-trained and administered a Western-conceived hospital, he was open to 
experimenting with alternative treatment methods, some of which were derived from Ayurvedic 
medicine, to create a pleasant environment for the patients institutionalized there.  
In terms of symbolism, the modern hospital is a significant break from the earlier asylums, 
which were an important symbol of British superiority and authority. The modern hospital was 
primarily intended to treat the mental illness of its patients with an appreciation of the holistic 
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makeup of the patient aside from the illness itself, not act as a fist of the dominating colonial 
government that sought to quash evidence of the British “weak.” This may be seen clearly in the 
terminology used to describe the patients in the asylums, who were often referred to as “inmates.”97 
This contrasts with the Ranchi hospital’s term, simply “patients,” even though many of those at 
Ranchi were technically criminal lunatics.98 We also ought to be careful about drawing a sharp 
biomedical/indigenous divide because, as Dhunjibhoy’s therapy styles reveal, there was greater 
interaction between the two systems despite the lingering attitudes of many British elite concerning 
the “unscientific” nature of indigenous treatments. The important takeaway from this section, in any 
case, is that the modern hospital begins to separate the identity of the patient from the identity of the 
disease so that the story of the patient can interweave with the story of the disease, not become 
limited to it. This will be a prominent theme in Sarah Pinto’s analysis of the relationship between 
mental illness and kinship in contemporary India, and we find in this transition a foreshadowing of 
developments in the legal language that seek to emphasize patient-centric care that is intended to 
alleviate the patient’s ills primarily and protect society secondarily. 
 
  
                                                          
97 See Ernst, 1991 
98 Ibid., 36 
78 
 
MADNESS IN CONTEMPORARY NORTH INDIA 
 Since we have devoted many pages for the discussion of the asylums, which occupied a pivotal 
phase of psychiatry in India, it would make sense on one hand to organize our discussions of 
contemporary developments in the context of themes pertaining to the asylum, such as enforcement 
of authority by those considered “superior” and the desire to rid society of its madmen. When we 
turn to the contemporary psychiatric scene as depicted in Sarah Pinto’s ethnography, Daughters of 
Parvati, there is indeed little doubt that the ideas of the asylum and what it stood for continue to 
shape psychiatry and discussions around it. Since Pinto specifically examines women in her 
anthropological study, she notes the phenomenon of “‘dumped women’ – a social and medical crisis 
iconic of the asylum era…[and how] the idea of dumped women is part of how people have come to 
understand contemporary Indian psychiatry and address its current crises and darker past” (13). 
Other themes, such as the “enact[ment] of power systems on and through patients,” continue from 
the asylum era though in different forms; for instance, the imposition of power structures for which 
the asylum was once responsible now tends to be expressed through pharmaceuticals because 
“drugs…[help] regulat[e] and enforc[e] ways of being” (19).  
However, attempting to analyze contemporary notions of madness through the lens of the 
asylum era’s legacies and discontinuities would be ultimately a superficial endeavor, suggests Pinto, 
since psychiatry in India is “a complex map of personhood, bodies, and brains; ideas about what it 
means to be a person, a citizen, a man, a woman, and what it means to love, to desire, or to care for” 
(26). Once we “look beyond the asylum as a ground for critique, beyond the question of its 
persistence as a system of discipline…an (sic.) symbol of the regulating of norms,” we may begin to 
appreciate the dimensions in which “the history of the asylum in India and things particular to 
contemporary psychiatric practice in a pluralistic setting tell us something about madness other than 
that psychiatry is, first and foremost, a way of enforcing what society views to be ‘normal’” (22). 
Rather than try to seek continuities or even discontinuities in themes established in the asylum era, 
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Pinto encourages us to adopt a fresh stance altogether, one that is much more attuned to the blend 
of “instabilities of love, medicine, and narrative” that play an integral role in the expression of insanity 
(22). In fact, she describes her own book, at “second glance,” as one about “love, marriage, and 
family…especially about the violence and undoing that are part of their makeup, the way bonds are 
unpurled and knitted into new designs much like the sweaters [she] once watched village women 
unravel and remake to fit the shapes of growing children” (7). Rather than organizing her 
ethnography around ideas of authority, control, and normalcy in a medical setting, rather than seeing 
madness as fundamentally a form of social deviance, she finds it much more enriching to understand 
madness as woven into a larger story of delicate, meaningful, and beautiful but potentially 
deleterious human relationships – their dissolving and their reconstruction.  
We can thus consider Pinto’s book as an invitation to critically examine the approach we have 
used thus far in our consideration of madness, its perceptions, and its treatments. We have tended to 
focus on themes of authority and social deviance; in this section, we will relegate these foci in favor 
of understanding madness as a dimension of the human experience manifest through interpersonal 
relationships. We will engage with the stories of several women (but only one in particular) depicted 
in the pages of Pinto’s ethnography as an introduction to the complexities of constructing a just 
picture of insanity. Our reader may be tempted to entertain the thought that this entire paper up until 
this point has been based on a faulty, somehow incomplete analysis since we are now highlighting 
the merits of an alternative approach. The latter, perhaps more holistic approach is naturally better 
suited for an analysis that draws on anthropological sources than historical sources. An ethnographer 
can hear, record, and respond to the subject’s voice; by contrast, “[a]s is always the case when dealing 
with one-sided institutional evidence, the account of the patient is silenced” (Ernst, 2014:92-93). The 
difficulty of adopting a patient-centric approach, then, is built into the nature of the sources for the 
earlier sections. Nevertheless, we can focus on one theme characteristic of the asylums because it 
continues to underlie the relationships detailed in Pinto’s book – abandonment. However, where 
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abandonment in the asylums implied a desire to rid society of its unworthy or inferior members, it 
manifested in the settings studied by Pinto as “a blurry field of everyday acts of loving, caring, 
treating, and being” (29). 
There are two more important points to mention before exploring madness in contemporary 
(north) India. One, there will be little to no mention of Āyurveda in this chapter, which may seem odd 
given the detailed treatment of Āyurveda earlier. Present-day Indian psychiatry shows evidence of 
various influences, so unless we were to visit an Ayurvedic practitioner specifically, we are unlikely 
to see Ayurvedic treatments that follow largely from the texts. Pinto’s book will take us through 
several mental illness treatment spaces, including an old asylum, a private ward, and a public 
government hospital, neither of which is a dedicated Ayurvedic center; these spaces themselves, we 
shall see, are wound up into the sticky, often ill-defined web of love and family relationships. This is 
not surprising as traditional relationships in India are often based on notions of “giving” and 
“indebtedness” (e.g., the duties a young man has in caring for his elderly parents)99; madness, then, 
could be a powerful agent in the undoing and twisting of such relationships, especially in the context 
of abandonment. Secondly, treatment of insanity involves a close engagement with the legal system 
and its comprehension of insanity. Thus, an aside about major developments in the legal language of 
madness leading up to the present day would be helpful. 
Hyne-Sutherland examines three key pieces of legislation spanning a century: the Indian 
Lunacy Act of 1912, enacted during the latter period of the asylums, the Mental Health Act of 1987, 
and the Mental Health Care Bill of 2013. She pays close attention to the ways in which the legal 
language surrounding madness has changed over time, concluding that perspectives shifted “from 
what to do about a person with madness to identifying and understanding the actual condition of the 
person” (70-71). Where the 1912 Act refers to a “‘lunatic’ [as] an idiot or a person of unsound mind” 
                                                          
99 See Sarah Lamb’s ethnography of a rural Bengali village, White Saris and Sweet Mangoes: Aging, Gender, and Body in 
North India, for a detailed treatment. 
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and the 1987 Act designates a “‘mentally ill prisoner’ [as] a mentally ill person for whose detention 
in…[a] place of safe custody…an order…has been made,” the most recent bill suggests a “‘prisoner 
with mental illness’ means a person with mental illness” (69). Legally, at least, madness is considered 
in a crucial way separate from the person whom it afflicts; it thus affords the patient an identity 
greater than the mental illness itself. Interestingly, we can begin identifying this shift in perspective 
with the development of the modern hospital under Dhunjibhoy in the 1920s and 1930s thanks to 
the language used to refer to the mentally ill (“patients” as opposed to “inmates”) and his emphasis 
on work therapy. However, it was not until almost eighty years after this time that the legal system 
adopted a comparable attitude. Pinto’s research, published in 2014, then, is situated in a time period 
when the legal language for the mentally ill was in a crucial, transformational phase.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had already taken several steps that encouraged treatment 
rather than the institutionalization of the mentally ill. For instance, the Agra Mental Hospital that we 
will encounter shortly was directed by the Court in the 1990s “to refashion itself as a research and 
teaching institution…Agra became part of a health system emphasizing outpatient medicine and 
focusing on rehabilitation instead of residency…, plac[ing] emphasis on treatment rather than 
institutionalization” (Pinto 54-55). The context for Pinto’s work, then, is a social and legal approach 
to medicalized madness that is in the process of shifting from one aiming to pin down the patient – 
socially, legally, and medically – to one addressing the illness in the context of the patient’s holistic 
situation. One could well remark that the treatment of insanity is hence becoming more “Āyurveda-
like” due to the emphasis on careful, holistic evaluation (recall that Ayurvedic texts would advise 
physicians to prescribe medicines after having considered the humoral and substantive composition 
of the patient because “one size did not fit all”). 
It is against this background that we first encounter Ammi, an aged woman with 
schizophrenia in whose story we can begin to appreciate the complex relationships between mental 
illness and family relationships. Pinto learns about Ammi, whose name is really Neelam, in large part 
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through her daughter-in-law, Tulsi. She and her husband, Nishchal, were primarily responsible for 
bringing Ammi back from the Agra Mental Hospital, where she was institutionalized for several 
decades of her life. Many in the family blamed her ex-husband, Keshav, for her confinement at Agra, 
the mere name of which is a euphemism for the institutionalization of family members deemed mad 
thanks to its infamous connection with the asylum.100 
It would be easy, and tempting indeed, to see Keshav as responsible for “dumping” Ammi at 
the hospital since he fell in love with a woman he met overseas and decided to divorce Ammi. Such a 
reading would resonate with a “prominent critique” that in India, psychiatry serves to remove 
burdensome women for “protecting families from the contagion of women’s mental illness…and 
removing faulty or shameful elements from kinship networks” (Pinto 23). However, in her 
introduction, Pinto asserts that her book shows the limits of such arguments, which oversimplify the 
complexities of love and uncertainties in kinship. We could certainly identify “dumping” in the case 
of Ammi, if we were to use such a loaded term, since Tulsi describes her mother-in-law as a 
“worm…when she was in that place” (Pinto 44); it would be crucial to realize, however, that this 
“reduc[tion] to ‘nothing’” was not primarily the fault of the family – rather, it was the institution that 
robbed Ammi of her humanity (Pinto 45). Bringing her home allowed her to regain her humanity; 
Tulsi describes how “[s]he is a whole person now” (Pinto 44). The argument presented at the 
beginning of the paragraph helps us begin to identify themes of abandonment, but we must be careful 
not to generalize and misconstrue the delicate kinships that are navigated in the sea of mental illness. 
It would be a misrepresentation to suggest that Ammi’s illness caused her to be a stain on the family’s 
reputation; Pinto noticed in studying Ammi that “schizophrenia was something very human and full 
of thwarted efforts to ‘connect’” (45).  
                                                          
100 See Pinto 54 
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Nevertheless, it would be a mistake also to see Ammi’s family united in the view presented 
just above. An important dimension of understanding mental illness in India is the ways in which it 
reorders the family and results in relationships that are both “patterned, following the rules of north 
Indian kinship” and “improvisatory” (Pinto 75). Part of Nishchal’s and Tulsi’s responsibilities 
according to traditional family values was to look after Ammi and invest their energies in her. The 
same could be said about Nishchal’s younger brother, Dhananjay. However, Ammi would only 
occasionally recognize and hardly ever connect with her younger son, so there loomed a chasm 
between them that was all but traversable. Keshav recognizes this failure to connect on Ammi’s part 
and cites it as an important reason for the tensions within the family101; he also blames Nishchal for 
failing to connect with his brother. Nishchal takes a different view – he is convinced that Keshav did 
not make an effort to connect with Ammi; Ammi indeed “has compassion…you [Keshav] must have 
compassion” (Pinto 66). To this, Keshav replies that compassion was easy for Nishchal to talk about 
because he does not live with Ammi long-term and does not have to go through the daily struggle 
that Keshav does. It becomes evident that kinship is important to understand in order to analyze the 
ways in which mental illness is handled, yet there is a sense in which such an entanglement of family 
relationships is universal; perhaps, as Nishchal says, “Here [in India] the whole treatment is 
integrated with the family…not like in the West where they [patients with mental illness] are treated 
individually, as a case, away from their family,” yet the difficulties of love in family kinships is hardly 
a local phenomenon (Pinto 66). Nevertheless, Pinto analyzes the difficulties of assigning blame and 
the cause of Ammi’s schizophrenia quite nicely: 
For Keshav, Ammi’s inability to ‘connect’ was vitally important, a sign of incompatibility with 
family life and relations, of the inability to be incorporated into reciprocal bonds. His younger 
son’s hurt was understandable, and in Ammi’s inability to recognize others was an offense 
similar to Nishchal’s broken bonds with him. For the family to remain coherent, Ammi must 
come second. Connection was a state of being, a precursor to relationships. 
For Nishchal, recognition and connection were not given qualities but efforts. They had to be 
offered to be received. Though Ammi’s inabilities to recognize others caused pain, connection 
                                                          
101 Ibid., 66 
84 
 
was a goal, not a quality, and reaching out in spite of absence was necessary for rehabilitation, 
a form of intimacy Ammi had been denied. For Nishchal, connection was not a condition but 
an action, one that could reinstate the humanity lost in institutional life. It was the work of 
being human, of making human again. (67) 
 Within the family, the mental illness of one family member disrupts freedom for the others 
and the hierarchies that bind each one to another. Nishchal and Tulsi made the right choice in 
bringing Ammi home according to their understanding of their filial obligation. In a very real sense, 
Ammi was freed from the clutches of the institution, where she was not treated as a person capable 
of connection in their view, but this spelled the limitation of Tulsi’s freedom. Pinto says, “[k]inship 
involved the same thing: loss of freedom was part of the securities of marriage” (51). Mental illness, 
closely connected with vulnerabilities of kinship, could be seen in transactional terms as well – who 
must sacrifice what for whom in order to maintain connections or, more likely, constantly rework 
and strengthen disconnections. In addition, it could be understood as forcing a reordering of the 
hierarchies that normally connect family members to one another. For example, according to the 
prevailing norms of kinship, a son and his wife are obligated to care for his mother; in this case, it 
would be expected of Nishchal and Tulsi to tend to Ammi. However, due to habits developed inside 
of the “ashram,” as Ammi ironically referred to Agra,102 Ammi would offer to massage Tulsi’s legs 
instead.103  
 In many ways, the unknowability of what really happened inside the hospital mirrors the 
difficulty of piecing together a truth about Ammi’s life from her own fragmented speech and the 
discontinuous nature of Nishchal and Tulsi’s visits to the hospital. On one hand, the hospital harmed 
far more than it healed, effectively robbing Ammi of her humanity. Yet it was also the recourse which 
Keshav and his son took when Ammi’s illness was becoming unmanageable. Arguably, there was an 
element of love and care in even that decision. Finally, there is the account of the head of the hospital, 
K. C. Dube, whose “portrayal of Agra…could not differ more” from Tulsi and Nishchal’s (Pinto 53). 
                                                          
102 Ibid., 49 
103 Ibid., 56 
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History would know Dube as a progressive leader who criticized physical restraint in psychiatry and 
advocated healthy relationships to promote an environment of well-being within the hospital. What 
then, is to bring these accounts together? Perhaps the answer is that the hospital was not “one thing” 
as we may want to describe it – rather, it was a complex institution that must be understood through 
the various stories we may hear about it. The truth of the asylum, then, is one such truth destabilized 
by mental illness. The insane asylum was born as a symbol of British colonialism and as the 
implementation of the desire to make the shameful or deviant members of society disappear. There 
is little evidence in the case of Agra that either of those purposes continued. By this point, the hospital 
had become “a place for experiments in freedom, for challenging received wisdom about the nature 
of the mental patient and the environment in which she must abide” based on historical records, yet 
the testimony of those who know closely one such patient severely undermines such a positive 
conclusion (Pinto 53). This mirrors the difficulty of assessing Ammi’s personality within the home – 
at once, she was someone who did not connect with her son and someone fully humanized, desiring 
to recreate those connections if given the chance.  
 Earlier, we discussed the development of the Ranchi hospital in the context of the shift away 
from asylums under the powerful leadership of Dhunjibhoy. The image that resulted contrasted 
heavily with that of the asylum from earlier times – rather than hide the weak in society, the modern 
mental hospital respected the patients’ human dignity and provided options like work therapy to 
give them at least a partial experience of being a productive member of the community. The historical 
record would describe Dube’s leadership from 1950 to 1975 in a similar light, pointing to the 
“unlock[ing] of the wards…[and the] occupational therapies to supplement and in some cases to 
replace restrictive practices” (Pinto 54). Yet we know from Pinto’s fieldwork that such a view would 
be heavily one-sided. We could wonder whether Dhunjibhoy’s hospital was similarly subject to 
criticism from the families of those confined. The reality is that the historical record that placed the 
hospital at the center is largely silent to the accounts of the patients and their families.  
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 We mentioned that historical accounts tend to silence the voice of the patient while 
anthropological accounts, in allowing engagement with the patient directly, can provide a more 
holistic image; interestingly, Pinto’s book hardly provides text for Ammi’s words. She addresses this 
as a question of ethics – “[b]ecause [Ammi’s] language and self-knowledge were conditioned by 
psychosis – a state considered, legally and in formulas for research ethics, to be of compromised 
rationality – it was not possible to locate an expression of consent in conventional terms” (47). She 
continues to write: 
My interests, then, fell on the way other people’s lives, other people’s histories were formed 
by way of Ammi’s. The movements of Ammi’s confinement and rehabilitation were also 
theirs…Ammi’s life was woven into family life in the way kinship was, more than a collection 
of histories or perspectives on the past…Her illness and movements brought people together, 
pushed them apart, and made them reevaluate the nature of family, care, and love for decades, 
though for most of that time Ammi was physically absent, a void at the center of a vortex. (48) 
 One of Pinto’s central themes in writing her book is that it is richer to understand the effects 
that one’s insanity can have on that person’s relationships with others as well as its effects on 
interpersonal relationships between people who know that person affected by mental illness. The 
disagreements over the cause of Ammi’s institutionalization, her release, and her capacities to form 
and maintain connections with other humans shifted accountability from father to son to daughter-
in-law. At once, storytelling is a way of preserving history and meaningful experiences, yet the stories 
surrounding a family member with mental illness, much like psychotic speech itself, falter and jump 
around from pole to pole, defying efforts to extract a single truth or even one truth. 
 Due to space limitations, I chose to limit my discussion in this section to only a few chapters 
of Pinto’s ethnography. The further chapters focus on two distinct spaces of mental illness treatment 
– the private clinic and the government hospital. The stories contained therein explore the ways in 
which mental illness reworks marital relationships since many of the women depicted are on the 
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“margins of marriage.”104 The private ward, nicknamed Moksha105 by Pinto, “capitalized on horizons 
of uncertainty, including hope; it made use of inherent instabilities in intimate life, kinship, and 
narration; and it destabilized truths, making facts more fungible in the supposed interest of making 
things more certain. The effect of this was long-term involuntary commitment for women who had 
mental illnesses but may have fared well enough in the world, looking after themselves and using 
clinical care as outpatients” (Pinto 114). In the private ward, the family was hardly to be seen but not 
because the patients’ families didn’t care for them. Though this setting may appear much like the old 
asylum, forcing a separation between the patients and society outside, “[n]o one [including family 
members]…considered these women subhuman, animal-like, or incapable of social life” (Pinto 84). 
Pinto thought it better to consider Moksha as a “setting for acute care…a living space for people who 
need no restriction but who benefit from a bit of care…a halfway house…for starting [the patients’] 
lives anew…with the halves in the wrong places” (144-145). Due to “the way intimacy itself 
destabilizes language and involves risk…[m]adness, here, was on a spectrum of recognizable 
responses to love” (Pinto 113).   
 She contrasts this setting with that at the Nehru Government Hospital, where open doors 
encouraged the family to play an active role in treating the patients (part of the reason for this was 
also shortages of staff). Nehru, like many government hospitals, represented the move towards 
deinstitutionalization and focused primarily on outpatient care. Because many of Nehru’s patients 
were from poor backgrounds, the hospital was often a space in which the patients wanted to rest 
because there were “fans, lights, [and] running water” 106; it was not a place from which patients 
wanted to escape as was the case with Moksha. It is also at Nehru that that we also observe an 
instance of possession that would remind us of our previous discussion from the Vedic and classical 
                                                          
104 See Harlan, Lindsey and Paul Courtwright, eds. From the Margins of Hindu Marriage: Essays on Gender, Religion, and 
Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, quoted in Pinto 84. 
105 In Sanskrit, mokṣa means “liberation” or “freedom,” which sharply contrasts with the reality of the private ward. 
106 See Dr. C.’s quote in Pinto 163.  
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periods – “…when asked if a god or spirit had been coming to her, the answer was yes. A goddess had 
been ‘grabbing’ Kavita and demanding food…” (Pinto 165). We will not delve into her case, but it 
suffices to say that possession by deities is very much alive as a mode of mental illness in India today, 
though it would not be treated with incantations and religious rites as it would have been a couple 
thousand years ago, at least not in the hospital. 
 On the surface level, Daughters of Parvati shows that there is not one mainstream perception 
of mental illness and its subsequent treatment in contemporary India – the three different spaces 
through which Pinto leads us involve vastly different methods of treatment along with the questions 
and issues that go along with each, though Āyurveda, another focus of this paper, does not play 
strongly in either case. In some ways, institutions like Moksha are remnants of a darker colonial past 
in which the asylums sought to separate the sane from the insane, the worthy from the unworthy, the 
dignified from the shameful. On the other hand, modern hospitals like Nehru seem to have kept up 
with and perhaps led the legal developments in which madness became more of an affliction rather 
than the definition of a patient’s identity. On a deeper level, though, Pinto reveals the “windstorm of 
narratives” that attempt to make sense of mental illness as well as its connection to love, family, and 
marriage (242). We specifically examined ways in which Ammi’s madness had to be understood not 
only as an object of treatment in the Agra Mental Hospital but also as wound up in the tensions in the 
family members’ relationships to one another. The stories of the women at Moksha and Nehru, into 
which we did not delve for space constraints, speak to the connection between madness and the 
vulnerabilities of marital love and sexual relations.  
In the legal sphere, we mentioned that legislation has progressively afforded patients with 
mental illness an identity separate from their insanity. The scope of the law doesn’t stop there, 
however, and it also addresses the relationship between madness and marriage. For example, the 
question raised in contested marriages is whether the allegedly insane partner could have “chosen a 
union in full capacity of mind”; in addition, “[d]ivorce, custody, and nullification cases depend less on 
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a person’s rationality in entering a union than on the way mental illness prohibits the ability to fulfill 
marital duties” (Pinto 244). Hence, madness is understood legally to obstruct the completion of 
obligations accepted in marriage, whether by choice of love or by arrangement. Yet, there is a sense 
in which the legal language presumes a definition of marital bonds as the standard. The stories of the 
patients like Ammi, to an extent, challenge the idea that there is a defined ideal in family relationships 
that must be maintained or at least toward which the parties involved must work. Kinship involves 
“an effort to undo, to allow dissolution, as well as to re-form and bring together. Bonds must be 
unmade as well as made” (Pinto 74). Where legally, a dissolution in kin relations may be seen to 
shade into madness that inhibits the fulfillment of the duties assumed in those relationships, such 
breaking apart and rebuilding is part of the natural flux of relationships, and madness does not have 
to be that which breaks them apart; the story of Ammi’s illness is tied both to the reordering of 
kinship within the family and to the efforts therein to reconstruct. 
Daughters of Parvati tells a story that is at once local and universal. It forces us to reexamine 
the fragilities of our own relationships through the ways in which Ammi’s illness reorganized her 
family “unit” and the connections therein. It makes the point that mental illness must be understood 
in the context of kinship, broken relationships, and reconstructed humanity and that sometimes, we 
may come to grapple with the delicate nature of human relationships only when something like 
mental illness forces a disruption and reevaluation. Love can both cause madness and also be a signal 
for an underlying madness (especially in the case of “wrong” or inappropriate love).107 The family, 
easily considered a symbol of stability and locus of care and affection that may begin breaking down 
now or then, may rather be “always in a state of breakdown” in which family members attempt to 
maintain their connections in the face of every little change and adversity (Pinto 73). Connections 
with other people, family or otherwise, may not be given but are rather the object of deliberate 
                                                          
107 See Pinto 244 for four rough categories of madness connected with love and intimacy based on the women 
encountered in the book 
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effort.108 Finally, the ethnography is a testimony to the power and simultaneous futility of words and 
narratives. Where history presents an account that opposes those of witnesses, we may be left to 
appreciate the validity of all those stories at once, much like with psychotic speech in which the lines 
between truth and falsity, reality and imagined history, blur and effectively disappear. If nothing else, 
we learn from this book that madness is difficult to pin down as any one thing, that it is not simply 
the degeneration of relationships but that it is wound into the thread that rebuilds them, and that its 
study imparts insights that are at once specialized and broadly applicable.  
 
  
                                                          
108 See Pinto 67 for the contrasting opinions of Nishchal and Keshav regarding Ammi’s ability to “connect” – Pinto 
implicitly encourages us to adopt a perspective aligned with that of Nishchal 
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has led the reader through about five thousand years of history to answer the 
question of how medicine and madness, particularly the perceptions of and attitudes towards 
madness, have transformed through the millennia in what is now India (technically, the geographic 
focus for most of this paper is South Asia and not just India; only the final section on contemporary 
treatments of madness focuses on India post-independence) to shape modern developments in the 
treatment of mental illness. We began in the ancient period from which time we have concrete 
evidence of treatments for madness according to the Vedic texts thanks to an incantation in the 
Atharvaveda, which contains most of the religious and medical healing literature from that period. 
At the risk of overanalyzing the charm, we can conclude that madness was understood to be a mode 
of possession, usually by malevolent entities, but also involved the departure of benevolent spirits 
that ordinarily should exert influence over a good man. The human body was seen primarily as a 
means of expression for the demonic spirits without becoming fundamentally altered in the process. 
Yet there was a distinctly “medical” approach to treatment to supplement the rituals and chanting of 
the charm – the medical priest describes that he prepares medicines to help dispel the afflicting 
spirits. It is unclear based on the charm alone that the medicine was understood to be potent without 
the charm; hence, we used the term “magico-somatic” to describe treatment of madness in the Vedas. 
At once, madness depended on “magical” incantations and spirits, yet the disease was ultimately 
located in the body. We also noted that while the madman was understood separately from his 
disease, the fact of his lunacy would have necessitated restraint and control for the protection of the 
greater society. 
 As we transitioned into the classical Ayurvedic system of medicine, developed roughly 
around the turn of the Common Era, we observed the shift from “magico-somatic” to “empirico-
somatic.” According to Zysk’s speculations, Ayurvedic priests incorporated the framework of the 
religious priests with the knowledge of botany and pharmacopoeia gained from the fringe members 
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of mainstream society. Unhindered by restrictions of ritual purity, or so the story goes, these medical 
healers came into contact with a wide variety of community members and compiled the knowledge 
developed into the Ayurvedic texts, notably the Carakasaṃhitā and the Suśrutasaṃhitā. This ushered 
in the first rigorous medical tradition in the subcontinent, and the body, along with the diseases 
afflicting it, began to be conceived in recognizably somatic terms. One of the most unique features of 
Āyurveda is the doctrine of the three humors – vāta, pitta, and kapha – whose imbalance can result 
in disease. We found that madness took a different form when one rather than another doṣa was 
primarily responsible, and in some cases, the deviant actions posed a threat to society. At other times, 
madness was characterized more by lugubrious behavior. There was also the category of “external” 
madness, which could have been a recognition of the limits of Ayurvedic diagnosis. Alternatively, it 
could have been a way for Ayurvedic priests to gain greater authority such that they could still 
provide treatment in cases where patients may be taken to an exorcist instead. Due to inclusion of 
seemingly “positive” qualities in the symptoms of madness due to possession, such as an affinity for 
music, we concluded using Hyne-Sutherland’s analysis that the defining feature was not dangerous 
or painful behavior but rather deviance from an established norm. Stretching this idea perhaps too 
much and pointing to the rather jarring threats prescribed in certain cases, we could say that treating 
madness was not primarily for the benefit of the patient but rather for ensuring the smooth 
functioning of the community; this would be largely conjecture, however. 
 The next major phase we examined was the age of British colonialism, in particular the 1800s 
with a special emphasis on the first half of the century. In many ways, this is one of the most complex 
periods of medical history in India, and there is a wide variety of primary sources, such as the papers 
of medical superintendents, that have been analyzed by scholars like Waltraud Ernst. What we learn 
is that the asylums established in the major British centers like Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta were 
packages of irony – the word “asylum” is usually used with a positive connotation in English to mean 
“shelter” or “protection,” yet the insane asylums of the Raj were quite the opposite for the patients. 
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Many asylum superintendents profited off the inmates’ provisions, leading to many deaths behind 
the dark walls of the institutions. One could make a fair argument that the asylums were really meant 
for the protection of society, for the removal of the shameful segments of the population. The latter 
idea helps connect the asylums with colonial ideology since the British officers needed to maintain 
their self-image as formidable rulers. Part of the messiness of mental illness treatment came from the 
connection between medical careers and promises of quick but shady fortunes. While legislation 
helped clean up the medical profession generally, treatment for mental illness was often embroiled 
in disagreement, sometimes even over the potential for Western somatic medicine to treat mentally 
ill patients. 
 The early- to mid-1900s could be described as a period of modernization and the transition 
away from the medical systems established by imperial rule. We examined two roughly simultaneous 
developments: the greater official recognition of a (modernizing) Āyurveda on the Indian medical 
scene and the development of the modern mental hospital that sought to escape its asylum past. 
Āyurveda was not taken seriously by the colonial administration until it was recognized as a cost-
effective means of administering medical treatments, especially in rural areas. Despite heavy 
skepticism of its methods, the British gradually afforded it greater authority; combined with the 
passionate nationalist discourses of the time, which incorporated Āyurveda into their visions of an 
independent, authentic India, Āyurveda underwent several changes that would ensure its survival 
well into the future. For example, the traditional system of apprenticeship that emphasized attention 
to the local context was replaced by a degree-course -style education that attempted to legitimize and 
expand the reach of Āyurveda.  
 Concurrently, through the process of Indianization, authority over medical hospitals was 
gradually transferred to Indian doctors, such as Dhunjibhoy. Despite persistent racism, he was able 
to create a successful mental illness treatment facility that emphasized care and rehabilitation rather 
than exclusion and confinement. He incorporated new methods, such as work therapy and herbal 
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remedies that Āyurveda had long known, to develop a modern hospital that would allow patients to 
feel cared for and useful to society. Where the asylums had understood their patients as largely 
identical with their illness, Dhunjibhoy’s hospital at Ranchi allowed its patients to maintain an 
identity separate from the illness, such as religious identities around which certain therapies would 
be oriented. We could see this as anticipating developments in the legal language, which slowly 
moved towards referring to patients as being afflicted by mental illness rather than defined by it; this 
is perhaps best seen in the Mental Health Care Bill of 2013. Indeed, we could say that such recent 
legal developments are grounded in the history of the asylum, the history of Western medicine’s 
interactions with traditional Indian medicine, and the efforts of leaders of modern mental hospitals 
to move away from the ideology of the asylum and bring the focus of mental health care to the patient 
first and foremost. 
 The 2013 Bill coincides roughly with Sarah Pinto’s anthropological research of mentally ill 
women in north India. She asks us to adopt a new frame of reference that moves away from the 
questions we had been asking in our historical study thus far – rather than analyze madness and its 
treatment in terms of authority relationships, contrasts between exclusion and care, or contrasts 
between somatic and moral views, it is richer to understand mental illness through kinship. That is, 
many of the patients she studied were caught in a web of vulnerable relationships, either with their 
children, their spouses, or their lovers, and she found it nearly impossible to generate one account of 
any of their stories. The reworking of those relationships and the duties and expectations that went 
along with each was as much part of the mental illness as was the institution or the family that was 
supposed to provide treatment. Madness, she writes, was almost more about navigating the ordinary 
bumps and dissolutions in kinship than about deviance from normalcy. Daughters of Parvati presents 
a picture of madness that is radically different from that in any other source examined in this thesis. 
Part of the reason is that this is the only ethnographic source we have employed significantly, and by 
its very nature, it is able to engage with the speech of the patient, family members, and hospital staff. 
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Along the way, Pinto infuses her own stories of managing strained relationships and finds several 
striking points of similarity between the vulnerabilities she experienced and those she witnessed in 
her research. Ultimately, the conclusion she draws is that families indeed care deeply for their 
mentally ill relatives, and some institutions incorporate family into hospital treatment while others 
tend to isolate their patients from the outside world. Mental illness is wound up in the often ill-
defined network of relationships that involve love and commitment, and it cannot be examined 
merely as an object of attention in the institution.  
 On a final note, we could ask why it is important to study mental illness. If Sarah Pinto’s book 
holds any weight, then psychological vulnerabilities are part of the natural dissolutions of and 
subsequent efforts to rebuild relationships with other human beings. Understanding mental illness 
and the ways in which our society handles it speaks volumes about our capacities to face strained 
connections and communicate the needs and sensitivities of individuals in the community. In 
addition, studying a society’s response to its mentally ill patients reflects on its culture. Psychologist 
Nev Jones asserts that “culture profoundly influences every aspect about how madness develops and 
expresses itself, from its onset to its full-blown state, from how the afflicted experience it to how 
others respond to it, whether it destroys you or leaves you whole” (Dobbs). We saw that patients 
with mental illness largely suffered as subjects of the asylum system, which largely stripped them of 
their humanity. With the advent of the modern mental hospital and the accompanying emphasis on 
rehabilitation rather than suppression, patients’ whole identities were given greater attention. 
Finally, modern legislation, reflecting several of the important transitions of attitude in the post-
asylum era, is helping India create a culture in which those with mental illness are treated as valued, 
“whole”109 members of society.  
  
                                                          
109 See Dobbs 
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